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——————————– ABSTRACT ——————————–
This master thesis compares the Norwegian model for compensation of
sheep lost due to predation with the social planner optimum. The Norwegian
model is based on the concept of compensating the observed damage caused
by carnivores. I also analyze an alternative compensation scheme where the
compensation is paid in advance. The results of the analysis shows that the
usual compensation scheme removes farmers’ incentives to protect their herd.
This do not occur in the alternative model. However it might be that this
alternative model is difficult to use in Norway because of distribution and
fairness. It is shown that the conservation agency can maintain protective
effort through subsidies under the assumption that there are no moral hazard.
But even with this correction, it seems like the Norwegian compensation
scheme gives the sheep herders’ increased profitability, and thus their sheep
stock is larger than what is considered social optimal. By a numerical example
it is shown that the loss from the compensation scheme, when protective effort
is not subsidized, is greater the greater the effect of the protective effort. Thus
it seems like the present Norwegian compensation scheme is costly in terms
of transaction costs, but that the alternative approach might not be a perfect
solution either.
——————————————————————————————
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1 Introduction
1.1 Presentation of the Problem
The large predators lynx (Lynx lynx ), wolf (Canis lupus), wolverine (Gulo gulo), brown
bear (Ursus arctos) and golden eagle (Aquila chrysaetos) are some of the endangered
species in the world today. All of them can be found in the Norwegian fauna. To maintain
a biological diversity, the public policy has been to protect the carnivores so that their
populations could reach a sustainable level. This commitment was made by signing the
Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats in 1979.
This was ratified in 1986 and has played an important part of the Norwegian conservation
policy the latest years, cf. stortingsmelding 35 1996/97.1 Due to these policies, we
have seen a rise in the number of carnivores the latest decades. (Mortensen , 2008)
However, such an increase in the carnivore stock comes at the cost of the farmers, since
the carnivores tend to prey on their livestock. This thesis will examine the conflict that
occurs between sheep herders and carnivores in Norway. The main question being how
the farmers’ incentives for protecting the herd will change during different compensation
schemes, compared to the social optimum.
The compensation scheme used in Norway is based on a commonly used ex-post payment.
The animals proven to be killed by the endangered carnivores are being compensated in
full. As a contrast to this scheme, the Swedes have taken use of an ex-ante compensation
scheme in the Sami reindeer (Rangifer tarandus) herding villages. Here farmers are paid
in advance for the damage that the carnivores will cause during their lifetime. Zabel and
Holm-Müller (2008) describes and analyses this Swedish compensation scheme. The two
schemes have different economical outcomes, which will be analyzed in this paper. It will
be focused on the incentives of such schemes, but I will also look on the effects the schemes
will have on the sheep stock and the predation. Common problems of compensation
schemes are moral hazard, transaction costs, and long time lags. But these might vary
greatly between different schemes. In 2011 the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment
selected a group to study the Norwegian PES (Payment for Environmental Services)
structure, and to see if this could be improved. (Ekspertpanel , 2011) Much of this thesis
will cover the economical aspects of this analysis.
The framework for the analysis will mainly be a static social planner framework compared
with the herders’ optimal decision. Zabel et al. (2010-I) compared such an ex-ante scheme
with the common ex-post scheme. The results from this theoretical framework was that
the herder would have no incentives to protect the herd stock from the carnivores under
the full compensated ex-post scheme. This problem did not occur under the ex-ante
1http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/md/dok/regpubl/stmeld/19961997/st-meld-nr-35_
1996-97/5.html?id=191155\#E19E1
1
scheme. However it was shown that the ex-ante scheme comes with greater transfers from
the conservation agency to the farmers.
1.2 Structure of the Paper
This thesis will start with a descriptive discussion of the carnivore conservation in Norway.
This will be shown in section 2. Key aspects of this section is the notion about normal
loss, and the general discussion of the two compensation schemes. The section refers to
the previous analysis by Ekspertpanel (2011). In section 3 the ex-post scheme used in the
carnivore conservation in Norway today will be discussed. This is studied in a static social
planner framework, and will rely on the model used in Zabel et al. (2010-I). In section 4
there will be an analysis of an ex-ante compensation scheme similar to the Swedish ex-
ante compensation model. There will be some short comments on the transfer size such a
scheme will have in Norway compared to the ex-post scheme. A static framework is used
in section 3 and 4, but I will examine a dynamic model in section 5 that utilizes some of
the information we have learned from the previous sections. The dynamic model analyze
the effects on the herd size in addition to the protective efforts. Some of the important
functions will be specified in section 6, so that it is possible to examine how the model
works in Norway with data inserted for the parameters. This will highlight some of the
theoretical results from the dynamic model. The last section summarizes and concludes
the paper. An appendix that draws some additional remarks is found in section 8.
References are made throughout the text, and a comprehensive list of these can be found
in the end of the paper. There are some references to laws and regulations. These are
named in the text, and marked with a footnote that shows a link to the official online
listening of the laws on www.lovdata.no. Statistisk sentralbyrå (Statistics Norway, SSB),
Rovdata (Section in the Norwegian Institute for Natural Research with responsibilities for
analyzing the carnivores in Norway) and Norsk sau & geit (The Norwegian Organization
for Sheep Herders, NSG) is important sources of statistics and data. Figures and tables
has been made from such information. These data sources are listed next to the respective
data figures. A list of figures and tables can be found after the table of contents.
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2 Descriptive Discussion
2.1 Reintroducing Species
Sheep herding have long traditions in Norway, and with the sheep herding there have
always been problems with the large predators. This gave the sheep herders a negative
view of the of the carnivores. In 1845 a law was accepted, as a part of a national plan of
making the predators go extinct (Bevanger , 2012). The law gave increased incentives in
form of payments to farmers, so that they would hunt more predators. The law was not
flawless, and lead to a lot of frauds (Bevanger , 2012), but it did also manage to drive
the predators close to extinction. By the 1930’s both the wolf, wolverine, lynx and brown
bear populations were driven close to zero (Mortensen , 2008).
Figure 1: Lynx family groups (Brøseth and Tovmo , 2013-I) and wolverine yearlings
(Brøseth and Tovmo , 2013-II), respectively. The target line represents the
governing goal.
In recent times, the notion of biodiversity has gained more acceptance. The predators
have a value to us, just for being predators. Some of them can have a value in controlling
the population of wild prey, when this prey do some sort of damage like grazing damage
or causes car accidents. They also have a tourist value. When you’re visiting a forest,
it brings some excitement to know that there are wild animals lurking about. But most
important, the predators have an existence value. For some citizens it would make a
difference to know that there exist a wolf or brown bear population. Just like we enjoy
the thought of there being lions in the Serengeti. Because of this, new policies came forth
in the mid 20th century. In 1959 we came to see the first compensation scheme for herd
stock predation, and in the 70’s some of the carnivores got protected from hunting by law.
(Ekspertpanel , 2011) At that time the carnivore species were close to extinction, but the
policy changes lead to a rise in their populations. The latest decades the populations of
wolverine and lynx have risen to what we can call a sustainable population level. This
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level is considered to be 65 family groups of lynx, in which it was found 69 family groups
in the Norwegian fauna in 2012 (Brøseth and Tovmo , 2013-I), and 39 newborns a year
for wolverine, which was measured to be 58 in 2011 (Brøseth and Tovmo , 2013-II). This
is shown in figure 1, used in these reports from Rovdata.
2.2 Herding Size and Farmer Composition
Sheep herding is a seasonal job. While there are various costs during the seasons, the
revenue is mainly in the autumn when we have the shearing and the slaughtering. Because
of this, the farmers must do other kinds of work on the side. This could either be other
farm activities, or farmers can have other full time work, making farming the secondary
activity. It is reasonable to assume that the herders with small herd size are the farmers
that do not consider farming a primary job. Because of this work composition, it might
be reasonable to include time constraints in the model.
Sheep herders release sheep on the grazing area in the summer. Since there are no physical
boundaries in the grazing areas the different herders in an area is subject to the same
predators and the sheep mixes. Thus the actions of one sheep herder influences the
others. This is examined briefly in the appendix in 8.1. This has lead to some level of
cooperation between the farmers that use the same grazing fields, so-called "gjeterlag"
(herding groups). NSG, the organization for sheep and goat herders, is organized so that
it is split up into different regional groups.2 Because of this, and the distribution problem
under the ex-ante scheme I will during the model consider this group of farmers instead
of a single farmer.
Data from SSB shows that the number of sheep in total in Norway has been pretty
much constant over the latest decade, however with probably a small decline, as shown in
table 1. At the same time, it is clear that the number of herders in total decreases, shown
by table 2. From this table we can also observe a tendency to large scale farmers increasing
the sheep stock, and investments in sheep farming is increasing over the latest years. This
might imply a tendency of high quit rate among low scale farmers, while farmers with
initially larger sheep stock are experiencing increased profitability. The table 1 shows the
number of sheep in the wintertime in Norway. Ekspertpanel (2011) states that about
twice this amount is free-range grazing in the summer time, and thus exposed to the
threat from predators.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sheep 1 111 513 1 083 216 1 059 139 1 023 622 1 027 076 1 029 380 1 055 223 1 045 495 1 041 119 1 037 065
Table 1: The winterfed sheep stock size over the latest 10 years. Data Source: SSB
2The regional groups are divided on two levels. The local herding groups, and the county groups assisting
the local groups in the region. More information on the herding groups can be found on www.nsg.no.
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 17 897 16 959 16 233 15 497 15 132 14 800 14 751 14 591 14 477 14 273
1-9 1 088 1 058 956 923 882 815 806 807 829 776
10-19 1 653 1 436 1 481 1 443 1 423 1 403 1 397 1 340 1 421 1 382
20-49 6 262 5 685 5 236 4 997 4 772 4 696 4 567 4 525 4 415 4 361
50-99 5 650 5 559 5 347 4 978 4 817 4 523 4 456 4 421 4 356 4 291
100-149 2 188 2 175 2 117 2 055 2 026 2 097 2 093 2 078 2 003 1 998
150- 1 056 1 046 1 096 1 101 1 212 1 266 1 432 1 420 1 453 1 465
Table 2: The number of sheep herders by the winterfed sheep stock size. Data Source:
SSB
2.3 Predation Patterns and Protection
The conflict that occurs from a rising predator stock is obvious. A higher predator stock
cet.par., the higher is the risk of sheep killed during the grazing, and the higher the cost to
the herder. However, the predators are not dependent on preying on the sheep. The sheep
herding is a periodic activity. In the winter, the animals are at the barn, the spring they
get offspring, in the summertime the sheep stock are released for grazing in the forest,
and in the autumn, the lamb is slaughtered where only some are kept for breeding. The
timing of the events is depicted in figure 4. This means that the carnivores can not be
dependent on sheep as food else than in the summer season, when the sheep is free-ranged
and unattended. This is a season where the access to the usual food sources are higher
than in the other seasons. Hence, Odden et al. (2002) argues that the sheep can be fully
protected without having any damaging influence on the sustainability of the carnivore
populations.
Lynx and wolverine is by far the carnivores that causes the most damage to the domesti-
cated animals. This is easily shown by the data presented in figure 2. It is also a natural
result of the fact that these predators are the most numerous of the carnivore species in the
Norwegian wilderness. Odden et al. (2002) examines the sheep predation habits of radio-
collared lynx in Norway. The analysis shows several patterns of the carnivore predation
habits. First of all it was found that only 8% of the killed sheep were completely consumed,
while 36% of the carcasses were not consumed at all. This shows that the carnivores are
not dependent on domesticated animals as food, like argued, but that killings take place
due to other reasons. In the same article Odden et al. (2002) presents findings on the
frequency of multiple killings. That is when a carnivore kills again after the first killing.
It showed that male lynx was more likely to engage in multiple killings than female lynx.
Odden et al. (2002) states also that the case of continuous killings are more likely to
happen to domesticated prey than to wild prey, since the domesticated prey do not flee
when they get attacked.
As sheep killings are a high cost for the farmer, and sheep predation is not a necessity to
the predators, it should be preferred to avoid these incidents. One of the main objectives
is to provide some sort of protective effort so that killed sheep are quickly discovered, the
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Figure 2: Predators share of total predation. (Ekspertpanel , 2011)
carnivore exposed, and taken out so that one can prevent the cases of multiple killings.
One of the ways of doing so is simply being there. So one of the best protective effort
is to patrol the grazing areas, so that carcasses are discovered quickly. In Norway this is
done partially by the farmer, but a large part of the carcass findings are done by either
tourists or a official patrolling supervisor (Ekspertpanel , 2011). There are however less
conventional methods to protect the herd. One method of protection is to radio-collar
the sheep, so that it easily can be seen if the sheep is not in activity, and thus it can be
discovered if an animal is dead and its location without patrolling. Haugset et al. (2011)
analyses how this can limit the predation on sheep. However they concludes that the
effect on the predation might not be very high. Radio-collared predators might also help
in the protection of the sheep. This can both help us to discover stray animals quickly,
and helps us discover predation patterns like Odden et al. (2002).
Ekspertpanel (2011) also highlights other ways of protecting the herd. One of these could
be to shorten the grazing period for the sheep. If the sheep is released for off-farm grazing
at a later stage, or collected at an earlier stage in the autumn, it will be less time for the
predators to kill sheep. The costs that follows this protection is due to in-field grazing. If
they are collected earlier in the autumn the sheep might have a lower slaughter weight, and
thus lead to a lower value per sheep. It might also be possible to limit predation by using
herding dogs, carnivore-proof fencing, move the herd as stray animals are discovered, and
use breeds of sheep that have a higher instinct of survival.
Hansen et al. (2013) analyzes the effect of the protective efforts used in Oppland county.
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Figure 3: Yearly sheep loss split in shares of normal loss and predation loss. (Ekspertpanel
, 2011)
They analyzes the most common ways of protecting the herd. The shortening of the
grazing period is considered an effective way to reduce predation. The effect of patroling
the grazing areas and radio-collaring of the sheep is however not considered to reduce the
predation by much. But these protective tools are still good since they eases the cadaver
verification, and thus might help to a general acceptance of the predators.
2.4 Normal Loss
About 125.000 sheep are lost yearly during the grazing season the latest years. However,
a large share of this loss have other causes than carnivore predation. Only 30% of this loss
is compensated because of predation. (Ekspertpanel , 2011) Other causes to sheep loss
can both be accidents, diseases or loss to non-protected predators like the red fox (Vulpes
vulpes). Most important sources of loss might be tick related diseases like borreliosis,
intoxication from eating the plant Narthecium ossifragum when this is fungal infected, or
viruses like louping ill. (Ekspertpanel , 2011)
One of the main problems with predation compensation is that it is hard to identify if a
predator has killed the sheep, or if the cause of death is something completely different.
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Many of the carcasses are even not found. This is a problem since the farmer only gets
compensated in full for the carnivore damage. This is also one of the main reasons for
the concept of normal loss. There are some areas in Norway that is not exposed to
carnivores, except for the golden eagle, hence the loss in that area have to be due to other
reasons than predation. This can help identifying the normal loss that should occur in
other geographical locations as well, given that they have the same exposure to diseases,
accidents and tick.
Not all carcasses are discovered, and for many of the discovered ones it is hard to identify
the real cause of death. In an attempt of compensate for all the damage from carnivores,
it is considered that the farmer can provide enough information to make it likely that the
sheep has been killed by the protected species. The normal loss and historical predation
values are used so that the compensation can be estimated. However this evaluation of
the loss has also lead to difficulties between the farmers and the conservation agency.
Statistics show that farmers apply for compensation due to predation for about 45%
of all the sheep loss. (Ekspertpanel , 2011) Still only about 30% of the actual loss is
compensated. This shows that there is a gap between what the farmers think they should
be compensated, and what they actually do get compensated. Some of the gap might be
explained from the fact that there are some problems of trust and transparency in the
scheme. The farmer has nothing to loose from trying to get more sheep compensated than
the actual carnivore loss. Hence there are incentives for farmers to report other accidents
as carnivore killings. Some normal loss might be compensated through other insurances
or the law Forskrift om erstatning for tap av sau på beite3, but the full compensation is
always better than a partly compensated sheep.
2.5 The Guidelines of the Norwegian Compensation Scheme
While there are a general acceptance of the predators presence in the wilderness, the local
herder might not have the same view. It is clear that the society in general have some
gains from a carnivore stock, this might not reflect the situation for the herders. Hence
we have two different parties with conflicting interests. The society wants a carnivore
stock, while the farmers wish to avoid predation. Coase (1960) states that under the
absence of transaction costs, social optimal solution will occur regardless of who has the
property rights. Thus we should - under the assumption that the farmers have the right
to use the wilderness for grazing areas - introduce some sort of payment from the society
to the farmers. This transaction should reflect the costs of the predators, so as we reach
the optimal level of predators and the correct optimal predation in pareto terms. In the
appendix in section 8.2 there is made an easy model on the Coase theorem applied to
3http://lovdata.no/for/sf/ld/xd-20040721-1129.html
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the case of sheep versus predator conflict, in which I have taken the opposite stand on
who has the property rights. This is however a pure theoretical example since it seems
well-established in the Norwegian society that the farmers have got the property rights.
Aanesland and Holm (2002) analyses the economical and legal aspects of the Norwegian
sheep herding and the predation conflict. The importance that the property rights are
well defined is underlined. Aanesland and Holm (2002) concludes after a legal discussion
that the farmers who owns the grazing areas should be assigned the property rights. Thus
the society should pay the farmers for the presence of the predators so that we can reach
a pareto optimal solution. This is in general defining the need for a compensation scheme.
The problem is however to find the best way to make the transaction from the society to
the farmers.
One of the important aspects of the Norwegian compensation scheme is that the farmer
should be fully compensated for the damages caused by the protected wildlife. This notion
is well founded in the Norwegian society and included in the law, cf. Lov om forvaltning av
naturens mangfold §19 4. Here it is stated that the farmer should not only be compensated
for the direct costs caused by damage from protected carnivores, but also the indirect costs
that follow. Another important aspect of the Norwegian compensation scheme is that the
actual loss should be compensated. Thus one wish to compensate the sheep proven to be
killed. As this is a concept of ethics that is most likely not going to change, I will through
this paper mainly consider the case where the farmer is fully compensated. I will however
still comment on the cases where we don’t have full compensation, to see how that would
alter the situation in Norway.
Another important notion about the Norwegian guidelines for compensation is the law
that puts some responsibilities on the farmer. Forskrift om erstatning for tap og følge-
kostnader når husdyr blir drept eller skadet av rovvilt §4 5 makes some conditions for a
compensation to be made. The farmer must have done the best to avoid or limit the loss.
Hence, the compensation can be shortened or cut out if the farmer do not ensure the herd
stock’s safety. This law is not very rigid though since there are no real way to measure
the loss-reducing effort, and hence there are not much effort that have to be provided to
be able to be compensated for loss. We might have some sort of moral hazard in this case,
since the effort level used to protect the herd is hard to measure and to control. I will
come back to this kind of moral hazard later in the discussion of the upcoming model in
section 3.3.
Another thing that might be interesting to note about the problem to measure effort
is that it is hard to find the compensation that the farmer should have. It was stated
that the farmer should be compensated for both the direct and the indirect costs of
4http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-20090619-100-003.html\#19
5http://www.lovdata.no/for/sf/md/td-19990702-0720-002.html\#4
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predation. Since it is hard to measure the effort and the cost of the effort related to
getting compensated, the farmer might in fact feel under-compensated due to problem
measuring indirect costs.
The most important aspect of the Norwegian carnivore conservation is that hunting is
limited by law. Lov om jakt og fangst av vilt §9 6 states that the Norwegian Directorate for
Natural Management is the organ that can allow or prohibit hunting of wild species. Most
of the large carnivores are protected by this law, either fully like the Brown Bear, Wolf
and the Wolverine. While Lynx are just protected in the mating season. This protection
of the species are limiting the options for the farmer, as they can not themselves lower the
populations of carnivores. The carnivore population is still regulated by the conservation
agency, but the farmers can not affect the population size. At least not by legal measures.
There are some incidents of carnivore killings or poison traps, but they are rare. Lindberg
et al. (2008) made a study on such poaching. During their research they confirmed two
cases of wolf poaching in Norway. But they also concluded that the numbers might in
fact be higher, since other radio-collared wolf went missing.
Because of the hunting regulations in Norway, it might seem like the carnivore stock
should be considered fixed to the farmer. This will also be the main approach in this
paper. Considering the Bern Convention, there exists a lowest number of carnivores that
the conservation agency can set as well. So the carnivore stock might be considered
fixed even from the conversation agency’s perspective. It is not possible to have a lower
carnivore stock that what is considered a sustainable population due to the international
agreements, and thus there are some limitations to the hunting of predators.
Furthermore it is worth noting on the side that the farmers do not only get economic
support for the damage by the predation. Forskrift om produksjonstilskudd i jordbruket
§7 7 states that a grant can be given based on the size of the sheep stock. This is so
that the agricultural activity is kept up despite competition from low-cost countries, and
despite the fact that there are more profitable industries in Norway. I will not discuss the
efficiency of such a production grant in this paper, but it might be good to have this in
mind when it comes to some of the results in the models presented.
It may seem like the Norwegian compensation scheme is basically an ethical and political
tool made to compensate damage to the farmers, rather than a tool for carnivore conser-
vation. It might just be that the compensation is there to create some local support
for the carnivore conservation, rather than actually manage the predator stock itself. In
this thesis I will however start in the static model with the latter approach, the tool for
carnivore conservation, since this approach is used in Zabel et al. (2010-I). The results
from this model might show us why the compensation itself is no longer a tool for carnivore
6http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-19810529-038-004.html\#9
7http://www.lovdata.no/for/sf/ld/td-20020322-0283-0.html\#7
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conservation, and thus the dynamic model is altered a bit.
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Figure 4: Time circle of ex-post compensation scheme
The sheep farming varies through the seasons, and thus the timing of the events might
be of importance. The seasons goes like illustrated in figure 4. In the winter, there are no
revenue, but costs due to keeping the sheep at the barn. In the spring, there are lambing
and grazing in the close areas. In the summer, the sheep is released for grazing in the
wilderness, and one could expect predation. In the autumn, the farmer gets revenue from
sheep shearing, sale value from meat and from compensation due to dead animals.
2.5.1 Costs of the Norwegian Compensation Scheme
Zabel and Holm-Müller (2008) underlines that there are four important problems that
might arise under the conventional compensation schemes. We might expect moral
hazard, high transaction costs, time lags, and problems with trust and lack of transparent
information. These problems can be found in the Norwegian compensation scheme. The
problem of moral hazard will be analyzed in depth throughout the model, however we
should take a look on the other issues in this section. Ekspertpanel (2011) describes the
costs of the Norwegian model, and goes in detail into the transaction costs of the scheme.
To get a structure of the costs, it should be looked on the transaction costs on the farmer’s
side and the conservation agency’s side separately. The compensation scheme is supposed
to cover all the direct and the following indirect costs of predation. That means that the
farmer should be covered regardless if there are transaction costs on that side of the deal.
However, that does not mean that these transaction costs are of no importance. They are
still there, even if they are covered through the compensation.
The transaction costs on the farmers’ side can be found through the increased workload
that occurs due to applying for compensation and to locate killed animals for verification
on predation. The search for the missing animals is however a cost that occurs even if one
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discovers that the sheep did not die to predators after all. What is being compensated
as a part of the increased workload is based on statistics from Organisert beitebruk (The
cooperation between NSG and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, OBB) (Ekspertpanel
, 2011).
Cadaver verification is also one of the large costs of the conservation agency. In about
5500 to 6000 cases of verification yearly, the expenditure is at about 9.3 million NOK.
(Ekspertpanel , 2011) Compared to the to compensation paid each year, this is still a
relatively low number. There are however some benefits of this work, as it helps to discover
predators in the geographical area, and it helps with knowledge about the predators.
The processing of the applications is costly as well, however there are no clear data on
how much resources that are spent on this. There is a deadline for the claims at the 1st
of November and a deadline of processing at the end of the year. Thus the 2500 yearly
claims generate a significant work load at the last two months of the year. (Ekspertpanel
, 2011) The processing of the claims is resource-demanding since each claim is evaluated
individually because of the lack of complete cadaver verification. There are also some
resource usage for the complaints on the decisions. In Ekspertpanel (2011) it is stated
that about 3.5 man-years is used for processing yearly in only Hedemark.
This processing is also a problem to the farmer, as it delays the time between the claim
and the actual compensation. While the value of sheep meat is paying off in the autumn,
the farmer has to wait until the beginning of the next year to get compensated for the
predation loss. The processing time leads to some lagging in income, which is costly to
the farmer.
The last con of the present scheme is that there is a lack of full information. There
is no clear information on which animals are being killed, and while this makes the
processing of claims more costly, it also raises the chance of errors. It can be that
farmers are under-compensated, but farmers also can raise fraudulent claims. Most of the
information provided by the farmers in claims are based on non-verifiable information.
Such as information about accidents and diseases in the stock, together with size of other
grants the farmer receives.
2.5.2 Farmers’ Dissatisfaction with the Present Scheme
There are several reasons why farmers might be dissatisfied with the presence of predators
even though they per definition are fully compensated. Some of these reasons are related
to the costs of the scheme. Since claims are processed by the agency’s judgment, there
might be a mismatch between what the farmer think should be compensated and what is
actually compensated. This mismatch is easily depicted by the data presented in figure 3.
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Much of this problem might origin from the fact that it is hard to evaluate the normal
loss.
The compensation scheme might also feel discriminating to farmers, since claims are
individually processed. The agency might consider claims differently based on other
discoveries of cadavers in the area or if there are any known diseases in the herd that
year. Such variations in judgment might lead to conflicts.
While the farmer by definition is compensated for the indirect costs, it is not always
that the compensation covers all the experienced costs. It might feel like a lot of un-
necessary work to search for cadavers and raise claims. Also, since a lot of farmers only
work part time with sheep herding, having other profitable work, their outside option, or
evaluation of spare time value, might be higher than what is considered through the data
from Organisert beitebruk (OBB). I will come back to the cost of outside option in the
discussion of the model.
There might also be some emotional costs that can construct a stronger conflict. This
is not related to the scheme, but to the predation in general. However it should be
considered since one of the stated goals of the compensation scheme is to gain acceptance
for carnivores in the Norwegian fauna. However when the farmer raises a small sheep
stock, it might get emotionally connected to some of the animals, even though they do
not live past the winter anyways. To see how the animals are ripped apart in the forest
might be a saddening sight. Care for animal welfare might thus increase the level of
conflict even though the farmers gets compensated completely.
2.6 The Swedish Ex-Ante Scheme
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Figure 5: Time circle of ex-ante compensation scheme
The ex-ante scheme differs on two main areas. The first one is the timing of the compen-
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sation. By the name, it is easy to understand that ex-ante compensation is compensation
that is paid prior to the damage. This changes the time circle from what we had in figure 4
to what we can see in figure 5. The compensation is rather paid out in the spring than in
the autumn. This gives the farmers an opportunity to improve the situation by providing
protective effort after the compensation has been made, thus lowering the predation. This
is conditional on one important factor; that the compensation the following year does not
decline if the predation rate declines due to the protection. The compensation has to be
completely independent from the predation rate itself. This will be explained in detail in
the model used in chapter 4.
The other important aspect of this compensation scheme is exactly that it is intended to
have no relation to the predation. The compensation being made relies on the number of
carnivores in the geographic area. Zabel and Holm-Müller (2008) states that the Swedish
ex-ante compensation is determined from the expected monetary damage that a carnivore
will cause during the lifetime. It is furthermore stated that the ex-ante compensation
scheme do not give rise to moral hazard due to the fact that the payment does not
depend on the livestock losses. This might seem like a simple assumption since the
expected damage a carnivore causes during the lifetime, which is used in calculating the
compensation, surely must depend on the predation. However for the modeling I will take
this first position, and just commenting on some of the possible effects.
One obvious advantage of the ex-ante scheme is the removal of time lags. The ex-post
scheme is costly to the farmers due to the timing of the payment. Thus the ex-ante
scheme helps against this problem. Another important characteristic is that the farmers
do not have to do a significant amount of paperwork to be able to get compensated.
Today the number of applications for compensation is about 2.500 applications yearly.
(Ekspertpanel , 2011) It is also important to consider the effects on the conservation
agency as well. Ekspertpanel (2011) states that there is a significant work load on the
agency employees that process the compensation the latest two months of the year. This
is much related to the identification of cadavers and analysis of the individual cases where
the cause of death is unclear or the sheep cadaver is not found. These are all problems
that do not appear in the ex-ante scheme. Since the compensation is paid in advance,
there are no time lags, but also no hurry to decide on sheep death cause.
The ex-ante compensation simplifies the work of the agency when it comes to processing
the compensation, and the work load at the end of the year. However, the compensation
scheme put some new requirements on the agency. If one should base compensation on the
expected damage by carnivores in a geographic location, it is important to both monitor
the number of carnivores and the predation rate. Thus the scheme depends an increased
knowledge about the predator stock. Today this might not seem like a large problem, as
the predators already are monitored closely in Norway by Rovdata, who publishes annual
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reports of each predator species and their stock and predation habits.
A problem with ex-ante scheme that arises is however the problem of distribution. In
the analysis of the Swedish ex-ante scheme, Zabel et al. (2010-III) concludes that the
distribution of the compensation works well. The Swedish reindeer herding is being done
by the Sami people in northern parts of Sweden. They are organized in different Sami
villages. The compensation scheme is set up so that the the payment is sent to the village.
Zabel et al. (2010-III, p.4) states that "From the villagers’ perspective, the performance
payment money thus is a common pool resource." It is the village that optimizes the
benefits from compensation and reindeer loss. The compensation is then distributed to
the herder based on herd size. The distribution might however be more difficult when
there are no such local society that organizes the herders.
Another problem with the distribution is that many of the predators stray and walk for
longer distances. Thus, as carnivores know no borders, they might cross over to different
geographical regions. As the compensation scheme is laid out so that the compensation
is paid out for how many predators there are present in the geographical vicinity, this
might be a problem. Both for the compensation itself, but also for the fairness and the
acceptance among the farmers. The problem might be even higher for animals like the
wolf, who strays between countries.
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3 The Norwegian Ex-Post Compensation Scheme
3.1 The General Ex-post Compensation
The Norwegian compensation scheme is based on the notion about compensating the total
damage caused to the sheep farmers. Together with this concept, it is believed that one
has to observe the damage before it can be compensated, so that the compensation is
fairly distributed. Since the total damage is compensated, the compensation value has to
equal the value of the killed sheep. So if the value of a sheep is given by p, this should
also the compensation value. The compensation per sheep will be given by q so that the
model easily can be examined without full compensation. q must therefore take a value
between zero and the sheep value, p.
The slaughter value of a sheep is assumed to be fixed to p. This is mainly just a simpli-
fication, but it can be reasoned why this also can be the case for farmers in Norway. From
the descriptive section we can see that there are about 14.500 sheep farming companies
in Norway, and many of them works in relatively small scale. On the other side, there are
very few distribution chains of food in Norway. It is also so that the value of the sheep
is influenced by the global prices, so even though we can see some organization between
the farmers it is still reasonable to assume that a single sheep farmer must consider the
price of meat and wool, in other words the ending value of the sheep, for given.
In Norway, the number of predators may be considered to be given to the farmers, since
hunting the carnivores are to a large extent protected by law. However, farmers might
violate the rules set, and try to lower the level of predators illegally. This can be done
through either poaching or by poison traps. I will therefore look on such effort in addition
to the effort that is used for legal protection. There are two main reasons for this approach.
This way the model relates better to the model by Zabel et al. (2010-I), which is also
analyzing the topic about ex-post and ex-ante compensation. But it also can be used
to show how the institutional characteristics of the Norwegian sheep herding alters the
model.
The local herder will have the costs c(e) of the illegal effort provided. This function is not
measuring the direct costs of the illegal effort, but only the expected loss of being caught.
The direct loss from the protective effort, both legal and illegal, is measured through a
time constraint. The farmer has also got a chance of protecting the livestock by legal
means, this protection is denoted E. In total, the farmer can spend his time on either
illegal protection e, legal protection E or on off-farm work o. The work not related to
the farming yields a marginal payoff r. The farmer must choose on allocating the time
use given the time limit of the period L. Hence the farmer faces the time constraint
L = e + E + o. With this time constraint, the local herder faces the profit given by
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equation 1.
ΠLH = p (X −K(E,W (e))) + qK(E,W (e))− c(e) + ro (1)
The herd size is given by X, and will be the slaughter level without any predation. But
to find the real slaughter, the number of sheep killed by carnivores given by K(E,W (e))
must be subtracted. It is assumed that the predation is declining in the legal protective
effort, KE < 0, and that it is increasing in the carnivore stock, KW > 0. In this general
model, it is assumed that the farmer may regulate the carnivore stock themselves, hence
the carnivore stock is reduced by the illegal protective effort We < 0. The profit equation
states that the revenue of the farmer is given by the value of a sheep times the level of
the slaughter, described by the first part of equation 1. The farmer gains an additional
revenue from the compensation due to the predation, described in the second part of
equation 1. It is then subtracted for the risk cost of providing illegal protective effort,
and added the revenue from off-farm work. Considering the time constraint, the profit
equation can be rewritten into equation 2.
ΠLH = p (X −K(E,W (e))) + qK(E,W (e))− c(e) + r(L− E − e) (2)
This ex-post model is pretty much the same as used in Zabel et al. (2010-I). The only
real difference is that this model takes the cost of criminal behavior into consideration.
In Norway, this is another mean for the conservation agency to control the behavior of
the farmers, and we should expect that it should be less poaching with this policy than
in the model in Zabel et al. (2010-I). The cost of criminal behavior in this model might
not be the best suited to make a social planner comparison, since the criminalization of
the poaching should lead to us expecting that the society wants the predator stock to be
given to the farmers. But it helps us to understand the variables the local herder has to
take into consideration.
The local herder wants to maximize the profits with respect to the effort provided under
the time constraint. The first order conditions to this problem is given by equation 3
and 4.
∂ΠLH
∂E
= −pKE + qKE − r Q 0 ; 0 ≤ E ≤ L (3)
∂ΠLH
∂e
= −pKWWe − ce + qKWWe − r Q 0 ; 0 ≤ e ≤ L (4)
First of all it should be noted that we have some Khun-Tucker conditions to this problem.
This is because the local herder can not spend a negative amount of time on any of the
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Figure 6: Marginal Predation Costs vs. Marginal Effort Costs
activities, E ≥ 0, e ≥ 0, o ≥ 0. The last condition can be rewritten into e + E ≤ L. As
long as the solutions of the first order conditions satisfies these conditions, the equations 3
and 4 will hold as equalities. This will not be the case if there are no internal solution.
If the first order solutions is less than zero, then there will be a lower corner solution to
the problem. On the other hand we also have an upper limit, since the farmer can only
spend limited time during the period, L. Thus the first order conditions also might be
larger than zero, when the total effort at largest is equal to L.
An interesting thing to note about this maximization problem is that we do not have the
usual revenue versus cost problem. The situation is rather that the farmer should replace
one cost, the cost of predation, with an alternative cost, the cost of protection, as shown
in figure 6. Hence as long the protection cost is cheaper on the margin than the predation
cost, the farmer should increase protection. In figure 6 we can see that it is beneficial to
protect the herd up to the point of E∗, e∗. From this point it is rather beneficial to accept
the predation costs. I will look upon the cost of predation as the gain from protection,
since protection is reducing the predation costs. Hence the reduced predation costs will
be considered as the revenue part of the profit equation in this analysis.
The first order conditions are pretty much the same as the model in Zabel et al. (2010-I).
The only difference is found in equation 4. Here the expected marginal cost of being
punished for poaching is included in the condition. It is obvious that this term leads to
less poaching than in the model by Zabel et al. (2010-I) with no such legal issues.
It should be noted that equations 3 and 4 can be rewritten into equations 5 and 6, with
Q = q
p
being the compensation ratio. Thus Q ∈ [0, 1] tells how large share of the loss
is compensated. The results of the analysis of the first order conditions are the same,
however it might enlighten the case to look on the compensation ratio instead of the
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compensation itself.
−p(1−Q)KE Q r ; 0 ≤ E ≤ L (5)
−p(1−Q)KWWe Q r + ce ; 0 ≤ e ≤ L (6)
3.1.1 Illegal Protective Effort
e
r + ce
e∗
−p(1−Q)KWWeQ ↑
ce ↑
Figure 7: Illegal Protective Effort and the Effect of Policies
To evaluate the results it must be made some assumptions on the function specifications.
It is reasonable to assume that the predation is increasing in the carnivore stock, KW < 0,
to either a diminishing or a constant rate, KWW ≤ 0. For simplicity it will be assumed
that the predation is increasing at a constant rate. The carnivore stock is furthermore
decreasing in the level of poaching, We < 0, at a diminishing rate Wee > 0. With the risk
cost function being increasing to either a increasing or constant rate, we have ensured
that the profit function is concave in the variable e, and that the solution is a maximum.
However it is not clear that the solution is given at the defined interval, 0 ≤ e ≤ L. The
figure 7 shows the decreasing marginal revenue of providing illegal protective effort, and
the assumed to be constant marginal costs. It will be a possible solution to this problem
given that the marginal costs initially are lower than the marginal gain from the poaching.
If there is full compensation Q = 1, it is clear from equation 6 that the terms on the
left hand side cancels out, and hence leading to a non-equality. This leads to a corner
solution of the maximization problem, resulting in no illegal protection effort at all. If it
is the case that p > q, the term −p(1−Q)KWWe > 0, it could result in a solution to the
maximization problem and illegal protective effort being made. It is easy to see that for a
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standard convex predation function, the illegal protective effort will be larger the higher
the difference between the sheep value and the compensation value. The law against
poaching is however limiting the chances of illegal protection effort being provided, since
it makes the marginal cost of providing illegal effort higher than in the case where such
regulation of the carnivore stock would have been legal. This result describes why we do
not see any illegal protection of the sheep stock like poaching or poison traps in Norway.
From the figure we can easily see that the marginal revenue function will shift downwards
with an increased Q. Hence increasing the compensation value will lower the revenue for
all levels of effort. For q = p it is clear that this function will lie along the e-axis. It
is similar with the cost functions. If the marginal costs of illegal actions increase, ce ↑,
that being either harder punishments or higher risk of being caught, it is clear that the
marginal cost function will shift upwards. Hence a higher cost of illegal effort will reduce
the chances of poaching. The variables ce and q can thus be considered policy variables,
and can be used by the government to achieve the desired results.
The model might tell why there is close to no poaching in Norway. The question is if
there would have been such activities in the absence of compensation and regulations. One
should also consider that the farmers might have some moral issues with killing endangered
species, and thus this restraints such behavior. There might also be some farmers that
appreciate the existence value and the tourist value of the predators, and therefore might
abstain from poaching. Another important factor is the alternative wage, r. It is often
argued that the outside option value is high in Norway, and that the profitability in the
agriculture is relatively low. Thus it might be that the alternative wage is so high that
there is little to profit on from providing such effort. This outside option is discussed in
section 6. In figure 6 this can be interpreted as the curve for marginal protection costs
shifting so high upwards that there will be no intersection. In the end we should however
conclude that the poaching might have been higher if there was no compensation made
to the farmers.
3.1.2 Legal Protective Effort
Equation 6 has many of the same properties as equation 5. Since the terms on the left
hand side cancels out when the compensation per killed sheep is equal to the value of the
sheep, there will be no internal solution to the maximization problem, and no effort will
be provided. With the assumptions that the predation is decreasing at a diminishing rate
KE < 0, KEE > 0. It is evident that any possible internal solution will be a maximum
and that the marginal revenue part of the equation is decreasing in the effort level. It
is easy to see the similarities with the case of illegal protective effort, that the marginal
revenue shifts downward as the compensation goes toward the sheep value. And if p=q
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Figure 8: Legal Protective Effort and the Effect of Compensation
there will be no internal solution. In the full-compensation situation present in Norway,
it can be argued as follows. If the sheep killed by predators are fully compensated, the
farmer will be indifferent if he gets paid buy the butcher or gets compensated from the
authorities. The monetary gain is the same anyways.
One should consider that the sheep herders may have other costs than the direct econom-
ical costs as well. There might be an emotional cost due to sheep loss. Herders often have
a small herd size, and thus they get a closer relation to the animals. Loosing animals one
has worked for, to something that seems unnecessary, might lead to some emotional costs.
In addition it might lead to some loathe when one sees how brutally the sheep has been
killed. These predations are more brutal than the slaughtering made by humans. Such
a cost can take form in a function depending on the number of animals killed. Then the
marginal effect will influence the effort allocation, leading to higher effort, both legal and
illegal. If it however leads to an irrational hatred against the predators, the cost might
be a function depending on the number of predators. In this case, it will be beneficial for
the herders to try to lower the predator stock, without this affecting the legal protective
effort.
3.2 The Social Planner Solution
To compare the ex-post and ex-ante compensation schemes, we must first see how the
social planner would optimize the sheep herding and the carnivore stock. For the social
planner solution we will look at the farmer’s solution, including the external effects that
the farmer do not usually take into account. However, for the social planner solution to be
meaningfully compared to the ex-post compensation solution for the herder, we must look
away from the cost of providing illegal effort, since the social planner indirectly has stated
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that the farmers should not provide such effort. The social planner wishes to maximize
function 7.
ΠSP = p (X −K(E,W (e))) + r(L− E − e) + V (W (e)) ; e = 0 (7)
The assumptions and specifications will be the same as in the case of ex-post compen-
sation. However the social planner do not wish that the farmer should spend any illegal
protective effort. In Norway it is so that the conservation agency wishes that the farmers
spend no time on poaching, rather having other professional agents dealing with the
carnivore population control. And therefore the prohibition of poaching is used. Be-
cause of this the social planner would prefer that e = 0. And we should also understand
that the social planner because of this do not evaluate any illegal effort and the costs
of this. The existence value is added to the profits since the carnivores have a value to
the society, which the farmers usually do not consider. It is assumed that this existence
value is increasing in the carnivore stock at a diminishing rate, VW > 0 VWW < 0. The
social planner consider the compensation just as a transaction through the society, and
not a gain. Hence this is not a part of the profits to the society. The social planner will
maximize the profits with respect to the time constraint, which is already included in the
equation 7.
∂ΠSP
∂E
= −pKE − r Q 0 ; 0 ≤ E ≤ L (8)
Equation 8 decides the optimal protective effort from the perspective of the society. This
equation gives an internal solution for maximum given that the function is concave in
the variable E, and that the alternative wage is initially lower than the revenue from
protective effort. Concavity is ensured with the assumptions we already have made about
the second order derivatives of effort. It must furthermore be that there is an internal
solution, since we in fact observe that the Norwegian authorities try to achieve protective
effort. This observation also underlines that it should be a solution to the local herder’s
maximization problem when there are no compensation. Hence it is from this solution
argued that also the ex-post solution could have an internal solution, but that this can
cancel out due to the compensation.
It is clear that equation 8 gives the socially optimal level of protection, E∗. Hence it
must be considered a problem that the farmer allocates the time use differently due to
the compensation given. With full compensation the farmer will not protect the livestock,
which clearly differs from the optimal protection level.
The compensation of sheep killed by predators must be seen as a redistribution from the
society, which benefits from the presence of lynx and wolverine, to the farmers that suffers
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from sheep loss. Hence the redistribution is not any improvement in the social planner
case. The lack of protective effort provided is thus considered a problem. We do not
achieve the socially optimal level of protective effort with such a compensation scheme.
In Zabel et al. (2010-I) the compensation is used so that the farmer would abstain from
poaching. But since the carnivore controlling effort is criminalized in this model, it seems
like there is really no use for a full compensation scheme to achieve this. Thus it seems
like the compensation scheme is not a tool for carnivore conservation. The compensation
is rather considered a redistribution from the society who causes damage to the farmers,
and thus a legal, rather than economical tool. Because of this result, I will in section 5
consider that the conservation agency manages to get to farmers to abstain from poaching
due to the cost of criminal behavior, and look at the carnivore stock as fixed.
3.3 Matters to Improve Protective Effort
It follows from the social planner solution that compensating for wildlife damage is good
in terms of preserving the wildlife and protecting the carnivores from poaching. However
the compensation also leave the farmers with no incentives to protect their herd in legal
matters either. There are some matters from the conservation agency to maintain the
optimal level of the protective effort, like argued in section 2. The farmers are paid to
maintain some of this effort. One way is to pay for the costs following cadaver verification,
another way is financial support to engage in protecting of the herd. The project of radio-
collared sheep has been widely founded by the authorities (Haugset et al. , 2011; Hansen
et al. , 2013), and reducing the grazing period is supported as well. (Ekspertpanel ,
2011) Another aspect is that the conservation agency is using effort themselves to protect
and patrol the grazing areas. Such subsidization of protective effort is not included in the
model in Zabel et al. (2010-I), however it can easily be extended to the model. Hence, if the
payment to maintain protective effort is a function ρ(E), the local herder’s maximization
problem is given by equation 9.
ΠLH = p (X −K(E,W (e))) + qK(E,W (e))− c(e) + r(L− E − e) + ρ(E) (9)
This maximization problem will give the same solution as in the previous local herder
case for the decision about the illegal protective effort. Therefore it will be no poaching
when the farmer is compensated in full. However the first order condition for the control
variable E has changed. This is now given by
∂ΠLH
∂E
= −pKE + qKE − r + ρE Q 0 ; 0 ≤ E ≤ L (10)
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If it is the case that the herders are fully compensated, the equation collapses into ρE = r.
Hence the marginal cost of effort must equal the marginal payment for providing such
effort. In this case we have an internal solution with an effort level larger than zero.
However, for the internal solution to be a maximum, it is clear that ρ(E) ≥ rE. In other
words one can say that the local herder will only choose to provide protective effort if it
is subsidized in full or even overpaid. If the compensation partly covers the loss, we can
allow the ρE < r and still get the optimal level of protective effort.
One problem with such subsidies is the problem of moral hazard. Since effort use in many
cases is hard to measure, the farmers might be able to claim these subsidies, but still
deviate from the intended behavior. Thus such subsidies would only make sense where
there are direct and exact measurable protective tools being put into use. Radio-collaring
animals and reduced grazing period are examples on measurable protective tools. The first
one due to the fact that the agency just can deliver the tool themselves to the farmers at
no cost to the farmer, while the reduced grazing period cost easily can be verified through
the reduced slaughter weight. The farmers’ allocation of time is harder to measure and
control. The farmer may still deviate from the agreed time allocation, due to lack of
transparent information. So compensating for the time a farmer would use for protection
would not help maintaining the effort level.
What seems interesting to note is that this protective effort can be ensured by the
authorities in two ways. The first being indirectly, by paying the farmers to keep some level
of protection. While the other way is just by providing direct protective effort without
involving the farmers. This can therefore explain some of the reason why the authorities
wishes to monitor the development and patrol the grazing areas. Such controls are both
essential to ensure that the carnivore populations stays at the desired levels, but are also
providing some protective effort that the farmer do not provide due to the compensation
scheme. In other ways, one can say that the effort allocation is professionalized through
the agency, instead of it being provided by the farmer.
It is interesting to note that due to the compensation, the society must take care of the
protection costs, and hence this will increase the profitability of the farmers. Such an
intervention could be considered an additional grant to the farmer. Ekspertpanel (2011)
shows how subsidies for protective effort plays a huge part of the Norwegian compensation
scheme. The transfers due to the compensation scheme will be analyzed in section 4.
There is another aspect of this that should be mentioned as well. Since the full compen-
sation ex-post scheme is removing all the incentives for protecting the herd, it also removes
possible mistakes in time allocation. If one consider the game that occurs between the
farmers, assuming that there is positive spillover from protective effort it can be the case
that a single farmer supplies too much effort than considered socially optimal. This is
because the farmer does not consider the positive effects from the other farmers protection
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effort. Calculating such a situation is shown in the appendix, section 8.1. However since
the ex-post compensation scheme is removing the incentives for such protection, both
legal and illegal, this misallocation is also removed. Hence the social planner can ensure
that the social optimal level of effort is reached through subsidies.
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4 The Ex-Ante Compensation Scheme
4.1 The Alternative Approach
An alternative to the ex-post compensation scheme is to pay farmers for the potential
damage before the predation happens. As a contrast to the most common ex-post compen-
sation scheme, Sweden took advantage of this idea in 2006 when they introduced an ex-
ante compensation scheme for wildlife damage caused to Sami reindeer herders. (Zabel
and Holm-Müller, 2008) The compensation scheme is not based on a direct per-animal-
killed transfer, but depends of the number of predators in the area. Hence, we will see that
the protective effort will not be reduced because of the compensation. The compensation
value is calculated from the expected damage a predator in the geographical location would
cause a sheep stock. Hence, the farmers get compensated more, the higher predator stock
there is. Sheep farmers would have an incentive to keep a high carnivore population since
they get paid directly for the amount of predators in their vicinity.
I will let the transfer be noted as T (W (e)). The compensation will be affected by the
number of predators nearby. And it is assumed that the illegal protective effort still can
be used to control the carnivore population. This way the model still relates to the model
used in Zabel et al. (2010-I). The cost from illegal poaching is still included here, just to
underline some of the policy tools. It is assumed that the compensation should increase
in the carnivore stock at a constant rate. With the same conditions as earlier, the static
maximization problem of a sheep herder given ex-ante compensation would be given by
equation 11.
ΠLH = p (X −K(E,W (e)))− c(e) + r(L− E − e) + T (W (e)) (11)
The first order conditions that follows are given by the equations 12 and 13.
∂ΠLH
∂E
= −pKE − r Q 0 ; 0 ≤ E ≤ L (12)
∂ΠLH
∂e
= −pKWWe − ce − r + TWWe Q 0 ; 0 ≤ e ≤ L (13)
It follows clearly from the condition 12 that the level of protective effort will not be affected
by the compensation. The farmer would have incentives to protect the grazing sheep stock
in ways that do not reduce the carnivore population. This condition is also being equal
to the social planner condition, which ensures that the protection of the herd should be
at the social optimal level. At the same time, equation 13 states that the farmers will not
engage in illegal protective effort as long the marginal transfer is high enough compared to
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the marginal damage from a predator. That is, if TW = pKW we will not get an internal
solution, and the farmer would have no incentives to reduce the carnivore population
by illegal means. If we consider criminilization of poaching as well, it is even easier to
avoid this behavior. The reasoning behind this is that the herders are not compensated
directly through the loss, but indirectly through the level of carnivores. With the ex-post
compensation scheme they were compensated in relation to the actual loss the had. Hence
there was no reason to reduce loss. With ex-ante compensation scheme the compensation
is indirectly related to the loss, through one of the factors contributing to the loss, the
carnivore stock. Farmers will prefer to have a carnivore stock as this yields a payoff, and
there will be no poaching. After receiving the compensation, the farmers can still reduce
loss, and hence do better than without the protective effort.
There might however be a problem related to how the T (W )-function is put together.
Zabel and Holm-Müller (2008) states that the payment is calculated from the expected
damage the predators will cause during their lives. But expectation is often based on
previous observations. So we should expect that the predation rate should be given by K
W
.
However, since the predation might be altered from protective effort, the expected damage
from predators changes as well. If the farmers experience that the ex-ante compensation
transfer is given by T = T (W, K(E,W )
W
), this should again lead to a deviation from the
social planner optimal use of protective effort. The problem is thus to make the transfer
as independent from the predation, and from the historical predation rate, as possible.
If the farmers sense any relation to their allocation of effort, the solution will be altered,
since we do not have TE = 0.
On the other hand, we could have the opposite problem. Considering that the carnivore
stock might be taken as fixed to the farmer due to the criminalization, the ex-ante compen-
sation would be a lump sum transfer. Like mentioned in the descriptives of the Norwegian
compensation scheme, the Norwegian farmers are subsidized through production grants.
With a lump sum compensation transfer, it might not be obvious that this is compen-
sation for the presence of carnivores. Thus if this lump sum transfer seems to farmers
to be non-related to the carnivore stock, and recognized just as another grant, it might
not remove incentives to restrain poaching. It is therefore important for the conservation
agency to enlighten the fact that the compensation really depends on and relates to the
carnivore stock.
4.2 Comparing Costs
One of the interesting aspects of the compensation schemes from the view of the authorities
is the size of the transfers caused by both compensation and subsidies. How much must
the herders be supported to fully compensate for damage and still provide the social
27
efficient level of protective effort. Zabel et al. (2010-I) shows that it is more expensive
with ex-ante compensation than ex-post compensation. This is due to the fact that the
ex-post compensation scheme is calculated without any consideration of the effort level.
However with the Norwegian compensation ex-post scheme one could expect a different
result. Since the protective effort is kept at the optimal level by financial support, we
know that the transfer size should be larger than in the model by Zabel et al. (2010-I),
and that the conclusion might differ.
The ex-ante solution is given by the equation 13. Here we can find the compensation
value that will ensure that there are no poaching and an optimal level of protection.
However, this compensation scheme is still governed by the Norwegian law that all the
farmers should be fully compensated for the wildlife damage. From the profit equation
we have the damage value function pK(E,W (e)). Hence if the farmer should be fully
compensated we must have that T (W (e = 0)) = pK(E∗,W (e = 0)). This being for the
optimal level of protective effort set from the social planner solution in equation 8 and
from the notion that no illegal effort should be provided. In the ex-ante case, this is the
only transfer from the authorities to the farmer. Hence this is also the total program cost
of this scheme.
The ex-post solution has some of the similar properties. The solution is given by equation 4.
But also here it is given that the authorities is going to compensate the farmer in full.
Hence the compensation should be of the size qK(E∗,W (e = 0)) = pK(E∗,W (e = 0)).
The level of protective and illegal effort are still set through the governing authorities,
hence these values are still the same as in the ex-ante solution. Because of this rule of full
compensation, we end up with equal size of the compensation in the two cases. However,
it is clear that this ex-post solution has additional transfer costs since the farmer is paid
to keep the protective effort at the optimal level. We saw that the protective effort had to
be fully covered by the social planner. Hence there is also the transfer ρ(E) to take into
account. Leading to the fact that ex-post complete compensation with protective effort
compensation is more costly than the ex-ante complete compensation.
Ex-post costs = pK(E∗,W (e = 0)) + ρ(E∗) > pK(E∗,W (e = 0)) = Ex-ante costs
It can easily be interpreted that both schemes will lead to the optimal level of protection,
however in the case of ex-ante scheme the farmer covers the costs of protective effort,
where as the social planner is covering the costs in the case of ex-post compensation.
Hence it can be stated that the ex-post compensation scheme with support for protective
effort should be more profitable to the farmer than the case with ex-ante compensation.
Zabel et al. (2010-I) do a fairly more complex analysis of this topic than what is presented
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here. However with the cirminalization of illegal effort, the success of the compensation
scheme is not measured by the removal of poaching. Thus is is hard to compare the
transfer costs of the two schemes when there are only partly compensation. One way to
look on this is to compare the transfer size of the schemes when the compensation ratio is
equal. However, for equal compensation ratio, also the size of the compensation is equal.
Thus the ex-post compensation schemes must still be the more expensive in transfers due
to the additional subsidies of protective effort.
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5 Dynamic Analysis
5.1 Dynamic Ex-post Analysis with a Fixed Carnivore Stock
In a dynamic analysis we isolate the dynamic and the static parts of the problem. The
sheep stock will be denoted by Xt, and the growth in the sheep stock is given by X˙t. It is
now assumed that the farmer face a given carnivore stock, and that they cannot influence
the size of this. Hence there are no illegal protective effort present in this model, and the
conservation agency sets the desired carnivore stock. If the carnivore stock is denoted W
and the level of protective effort noted as Et, the growth in the sheep stock is given by
equation 14.
X˙t = sXt − ht − nXt −K(W,Xt, Et) (14)
The intrinsic growth rate of the sheep stock is given by s. This means that I look away
from the usual assumption that species are subject to logistic growth. The reason behind
this assumption of linear growth is due to the fact that the sheep stock is directly regulated
by humans. Hence the sheep is not exposed to such as resource redundancy or density
problems. Subjects like food supplies are rather reflected in the cost functions of the
herders. The sheep sent to the butcher, ht is reducing the sheep stock. The normal loss
rate of the stock is given by n. That leaves the last part of the expression, where K
is the number of sheep lost due to predation. This loss depends on the carnivore stock
and the effort level, like we examined in the static model. The difference here is that
the predation also depends on the sheep stock itself. The higher sheep stock cet.par.,
the higher availability of sheep, and the likelihood of predation is increased. Hence it is
assumed that the predation is increasing in the sheep stock, K ′(X) > 0, increasing in the
carnivore stock, K ′(W ) > 0, and decreasing at a diminishing rate with the effort level,
K ′(Et) < 0 and K ′′(Et) > 0. The static profit expression in each period of time is given
by equation 15.
Πt = pht − C(Xt) + qtK(W,Xt, Et) + rot (15)
ht denotes the number of sheep that is slaughtered each year, while p is the slaughter
value. The slaughter value is assumed to be fixed. The profits Πt is given by the total
revenue from harvested sheep pht and subtracting for the costs of the sheep stock C(Xt).
In addition we have to take account for the compensation given for the predation in this
point of time. qt is the ex-post compensation per animal killed, while K is the total
predation. The rot-function depicts the costs related to the protective effort, given by the
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opportunity wage. The farmer face a time constraint, like in the static model, in each
period of time given by L = Et + ot. Inserting for the outside option in the equation 15
gives the equation 16 where the alternative cost of effort is exposed.
Πt = pht − C(Xt) + qtK(W,Xt, Et) + r(L− Et) (16)
We should note that q and W are the only existing policy variables, but they are assumed
to be given due to the existing regulations in Norway. The q is given since it should be
equal to the sheep value, while the W is given since the carnivore stock is decided by the
conservation agency. I will look on some effects of changes in these variables later, but
this will not be the initial stand.
This model relates clearly to the static model used in the previous sections, and thus
it also relates to the model used in Zabel et al. (2010-I). The clear distinction between
the models is the use of a growth equation for the sheep stock, and also the fact that
the predator stock size is considered given. Zabel et al. (2010-I) do not consider such
a dynamic model, however the authors have written a unpublished paper considering a
dynamic approach. (Zabel et al., 2010-II) In the dynamic model in Zabel et al. (2010-II) it
is however so that the sheep stock is subject to logistic growth, a condition that is altered
in this model that will be presented here. It is also the fact that the predator stock size
might vary in the model by Zabel et al. (2010-II), and hunting of carnivores are allowed.
The models also differs greatly in the analytical approach, because of these assumptions.
Given the profit equation and the sheep growth constraint, the herder’s optimization
problem is to maximize the present value of the profits with respect to this constraint.
max
∫ ∞
t=0
Πte
−δtdt subject to X˙t = sXt − ht − nXt −K(W,Xt, Et) (17)
I assume that the herders knows the size of the initial sheep stock, X0. The ending X∞ is
free for all values above zero. And the control variables, ht and Et, is non-negative. The
current value hamiltonian is given by equation 18.
H = pht−C(Xt) + qtK(W,Xt, Et) + r(L−Et) +λt(sXt−ht−nXt−K(W,Xt, Et)) (18)
This system has got two control variables. One in the harvest ht, and one in the protective
effort Et. There is one state variable in the sheep stock Xt. Hence we will have two
maximum principles (MP) and one portfolio balance equation (PB). These are given by
equations 19, 20 and 21 respectively.
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∂H
∂ht
= p− λt Q 0 ; ht ≥ 0 (19)
∂H
∂Et
= −r + (q − λt) ∂K
∂Et
Q 0 ; 0 ≤ Et ≤ L (20)
λ˙t − δλt = C ′(Xt) + (λt − qt) ∂K
∂Xt
− λts+ λtn (21)
First of all, I would like to underline the fact that this Hamiltonian leads to a maximiza-
tion due to the assumption that the cost function is strictly convex in the sheep stock.
This makes the Hamiltonian strictly concave in the state variable. It might be that the
predation function is not linear in the sheep stock, and thus influences the results, but
it is assumed that a concave predation function would be less of importance than the
convex cost function. This is discussed further in section 5.3. It should also be underlined
here that since we have linearity in one of the control variables, we will see a most rapid
approach path (MRAP) to the steady state. This means that the dynamics of this model
will lead to the steady state solution. If there is a shift so that we observe non-equilibrium,
we will have a immediate transition to the new steady state. Therefore I will only study
the steady state of the model.
MP1, equation 19, gives the optimal condition for the control of the sheep stock through
the harvesting. This equation states that the price of the sold sheep should equal the
shadow price of the sheep stock. Hence the marginal revenue of the harvest should equal
the marginal cost of a reduced future sheep stock.
MP2, equation 20, is a fairly more complex equation. But it does in fact state very much
the same as the equation 3 from the static model. The first part of the equation is the
marginal cost of providing effort. This must, in absolute value, equal the second term.
This states that the gain from the protection is the value of increased sheep stock in the
future, subtracted for the reduced compensation in the current time. It is not for sure that
this equation has got an internal solution for Et > 0, and thus corner solutions should be
considered.
The PB, equation 21, is stating the change in the shadow price over time. The growth in
the shadow price of the sheep stock, subtracted for the depreciation of this shadow price
should equal the net growth, s−n, in sheep stock, the marginal cost of an increased sheep
stock, and the marginal cost of increased predation when the sheep stock increases.
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5.1.1 Steady State
In the steady state we have by definition no change in any of the variables over time,
hence λ˙t = X˙t = 0. In addition it is possible to ignore all time subscripts. Equation 19 is
easily manipulated to the condition 22. Thus the shadow cost of the harvest should equal
the marginal revenue of the harvest.
λ = p (22)
Inserting for λ in the MP2 and PB-conditions given by equation 20 and 21 results in
equation 23 and 24.
−r + (q − p)∂K
∂E
Q 0 ; 0 ≤ Et ≤ L (23)
(s− n) = 1
p
(
C ′(X) + (p− q)∂K
∂X
)
+ δ (24)
Equation 23 is pretty much identical to the equation 3 in the ex-post solution. Hence
we can draw the similar conclusion. The condition will have a possible internal solution.
But if the case is like in Norway, that we have full compensation p = q, there will be no
solution for E > 0. Equation 24 is the sheep herder’s golden rule condition. The golden
rule states the steady state equilibrium and can be used to find the steady state sheep
stock given by the parameters. It should be underlined that the discount rate in this
equation indicates that profits are not considered equally over time. Thus with a discount
rate, the farmer is inpatient, and this would lead to a lower sheep stock than what would
have been optimal without such a discount rate.
Similar to the MP2, a large part will disappear from equation 24 if we have the case of
full compensation. The equation will hence collapse into
(s− n) = 1
p
C ′(X) + δ (25)
This equation will set the steady state sheep stock. An examination of this sheep stock
size will be dealt with later in the paper.
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5.2 The Dynamic Social Planner Solution
The sheep growth equation will be the same as in the case for the local herder ex-post
compensation scheme, given by equation 14. The difference between the ex-post scheme
and the social planner base line model is in the profit equation. The social planner do
not evaluate the compensation, but consider the existence value of the carnivores. Hence
the profit equation changes to the following.
Πt = pht − C(Xt) + r(L− Et) + V (W ) (26)
Here V (W ) gives the existence value of the predators W . The current value hamiltonian
changes to equation 27.
H = pht − C(Xt) + r(L− Et) + V (Wt) + λt(sXt − ht − nXt −K(W,Xt, Et)) (27)
Hence the necessary conditions for optimum changes to equation 28, 29 and 30. The
maximum is ensured given that the same conditions in the ex-post analysis hold. We will
also have a MRAP situation in this case, since the hamiltonian is linear in the control
variable.
∂H
∂ht
= p− λt ≤ 0 ; ht ≥ 0 (28)
∂H
∂Et
= −r − λt ∂K
∂Et
Q 0 ; 0 ≤ Et ≤ L (29)
λ˙t − δλ = C ′(Xt) + λ ∂K
∂Xt
− λs+ λn (30)
The first condition (MP1), given by equation 28, is similar to the dynamic ex-post counter-
part in equation 19. The second condition (MP2), equation 29, differs however from
equation 20. The condition states that effort should be provided so that the marginal
cost of effort, given by the opportunity cost, should be equal to the marginal value of
the protected sheep in the next period. This result compares to the differences between
the ex-post compensation scheme and the social planner baseline in the static analysis
described in section 3.2. From the similar reasoning, it seems to be the case that there is
an internal solution to this social planner problem.
The portfolio balance equation 30 has changed, compared to the equation 21. This is due
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to the fact that the herder does not care about the predation in the ex-post scheme, and
hence does not consider how an increased sheep stock will influence the predation. This
is taken into account in the social planner’s portfolio balance equation.
5.2.1 Steady State
The steady state solution follows from the same calculations as the ex-post steady state.
Hence the social planner steady state is given by
(s− n) = 1
p
(
C ′(X) + p
∂K
∂X
)
+ δ (31)
This steady state solution differs from the ex-post steady state solution in equation 25
in the term within the right hand side brackets. The difference is that the social planner
consider the increased predation from increasing the sheep stock, cet.par., while this is
not interesting to a farmer that is completely compensated. The result should be that
the social planner would consider a lower sheep stock than the local herder under two
conditions, the predation must increase in the sheep stock and the cost function of the
sheep stock must be convex. This can easily be shown through the following example.
Since all except the term inside the right hand side brackets in equation 31 and equation 25
are parameters, we can compare the term inside the brackets. For the equalities to hold,
it must be that
(C ′(X))EX-POST =
(
C ′(X) + p
∂K
∂X
)SP
(32)
Since we know that the predation is increasing in the sheep stock, ∂K
∂X
> 0, it must be
true that
(C ′(X))EX-POST > (C ′(X))SP (33)
From the assumption that the farmers face positive and increasing marginal costs it is
clear that the sheep stock in the ex-post compensation scheme must be larger than the
sheep stock in the social planner solution.
The ex-post compensation scheme which is compared here is the one with full compen-
sation, q = p. On the other side one can consider the social planner steady state as the
no compensation situation, q = 0. For ex-post partial compensation, 0 < q < p it would
therefore be a solution that would lie in-between the two extremes. This can be seen in
35
section 5.3.1, discussing the comparative statics.
Bulte and Rondeau (2007) analyze how local herders who are compensated experiences
increased profitability and how this might deviate from the social optimal solution. Bulte
and Rondeau (2005) also describe how increased profitability might damage the carnivore
conservation. This effect is not present in this model, since the carnivore stock is considered
fixed. However the local herder faces an increased marginal profitability of the sheep stock
here as well, which results in the large sheep stock. Thus it seems like the ex-post compen-
sation scheme might cause various problems due to such increased marginal profitability.
5.2.2 The Ex-Ante Solution
The ex-ante solution will not differ from the social planner solution. Considering that the
herder is given a lump sum transfer based on the number of predators, this collapses into
much of the same expression as the social planner. The profit equation for the herder
in the ex-ante compensation scheme is given by equation 34, where T (W ) is the ex-ante
compensation.
Πt = pht − C(Xt) + rot + T (W ) (34)
Compared to the social planner profits in equation 26 the only difference is the function
depicting the gain of the size of the carnivore stock. In addition to this, in both cases
this function holds a fixed value since it is assumed that we have a fixed carnivore stock.
Thus it can be stated that the ex-ante compensation scheme must equal the social planner
solution, and hence lead to the socially optimal state. Because of the general similarities
between the social planner solution and the ex-ante solution I will later in this paper only
compare ex-post and social planner solutions.
5.2.3 The Dynamic Norwegian Compensation Scheme
In section 3.3 it was discussed how the governmental institutions could correct for the
lack of protection effort. A similar correction could be discussed in this dynamic case. I
assume that the local herder sets the carnivore stock, so for the conservation agency the
sheep stock should be considered fixed, X = X. The conservation agency can now, under
this complete compensation ex-post scheme, only correct the missing protective effort.
The protective effort under these conditions can be found through equation 29.
The solution to this condition could lead to the same level of effort as in the ex-ante
solution, or the solution where the social planner could set the optimal sheep stock, under
the condition that the predation function is additively separable. In mathematical terms,
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if ∂2K
∂E∂X
= 0, we will have a correction of the effort level so that the effort corresponds
to the social planner solution. If we by chance should have that ∂2K
∂E∂X
< 0, it would be
the case that the effort level should be higher than the social planner solution, so as to
compensate for the higher sheep stock. When the sheep stock increases it is so that it
gets more effective to protect the sheep, and thus the more effort should be provided. For
the graphical analysis I will consider the Norwegian local herder with the full compen-
sation ex-post optimal stock, given from equation 25, and the social planner optimal
protective effort, given by equation 29. It is considered that the social planner would set
the protective effort through grants like discussed in the section 3.3.
5.3 Steady State Comperative Statics
5.3.1 The Simple Case of Full Ex-Post Compensation
I would like to examine how the steady state is affected by the different parameter values.
I will first look upon the simple steady state solution for the complete compensation
ex-post scheme, before we study the topic in more general matters. Hence this simple
illustration serves as both a base line for the more complete analysis, and as an example
on the extreme case of full compensation. The full compensation ex-post equation 25 can
be differentiated, and this is given by equation 35.
(s− n− δ)dp+ pds− pdn = C ′′(X)dX (35)
From this it is easy to find the comparative statics solutions and analyze how the steady
state is influenced by differences in p, s and n. The equation 36 states that the sheep stock
will be higher, the higher the sheep value. It is important to note here that compensation
value, q, must still be the size of p since we must follow the case of full compensation
for this to be true. Equation 37 states that the sheep stock should be higher the higher
the sheep reproduction rate, cet. par. And on the other side equation 38 states that the
sheep stock is lower the lower the normal loss rate is.
dX
dp
=
s− n− δ
C ′′(X)
> 0 (36)
dX
ds
=
p
C ′′(X)
> 0 (37)
dX
dn
= − p
C ′′(X)
< 0 (38)
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5.3.2 Comperative Statics of Partial Compensation
The extended analysis takes interest in the partial ex-post compensation. From this
situation it is also easy to analyze the social planner and ex-ante compensation steady
state comparative statics. Differentiation of the steady state equation 24 leads to the
equation 39, and can be rearranged to equation 40.
(s− n− δ)dp+ pds− pdn =
C ′′(X)dX +
∂K
∂X
dp− ∂K
∂X
dq + (p− q)∂
2K
∂X2
dX + (p− q) ∂
2K
∂X∂W
dW > 0
(39)
(
s− n− δ − ∂K
∂X
)
dp+ pds− pdn+ ∂K
∂X
dq − (p− q) ∂
2K
∂X∂W
dW =(
C ′′(X) + (p− q)∂
2K
∂X2
)
dX
(40)
In this differentiation it is indirectly assumed that the predation function is additively
separable. The K(W,X,E)-function can be written as K(W,X,E) = K1(W,X)+K2(E).
This is a simplification that eases the mathematics greatly. It is also is necessary for the
analysis that will be done in section 6. The comparative statics can hence be analyzed
from the equations 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45. It should be noted that the social planner
solution is equal to the case when there are no compensation, q = 0.
dX
dp
=
s− n− δ − ∂K
∂X
C ′′(X) + (p− q)∂2K
∂X2
(41)
dX
ds
=
p
C ′′(X) + (p− q)∂2K
∂X2
> 0 (42)
dX
dn
= − p
C ′′(X) + (p− q)∂2K
∂X2
< 0 (43)
dX
dq
=
∂K
∂X
C ′′(X) + (p− q)∂2K
∂X2
> 0 (44)
dX
dW
= − (p− q)
∂2K
∂X∂W
C ′′(X) + (p− q)∂2K
∂X2
< 0 (45)
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We know from our previous assumptions that the predation is increasing in the sheep
stock, ∂K
∂X
> 0, but we have not assumed anything about the rate that this increases. If
this increases at a constant rate, the equations does not change much, since the derivative
of the second order is equal to zero. However we might lift this assumption. But we know
from the maximization of the hamiltonian in equation 18 that this denominator is the
negative value of the second order condition of the hamiltonian. Thus for the hamiltonian
to lead to a maximum, the denominator has to be larger than zero, C ′′(X)+(p−q)∂2K
∂X2
≥ 0.
If we consider the case where the predation is increasing the sheep stock at an increasing
rate, it is so that the denominator in the equations 41, 42 and 43 are bigger than their
respective equations from section 5.3.1 in the case of full compensation. And thus the
dynamics show that the change in sheep stock size should be less responsive to changes in
the parameters than in the case of complete ex-post compensation. Zabel et al. (2010-I)
states that predation functions that are convex in the carnivore stock should indicate that
the predator gains a technological advance from hunting in packs. While functions that
are concave indicates that the predators are competing for territory and thus spend less
time on predation.
Examining the numerator in equation 41 the marginal effect of the size of the sheep stock
on the predation is included. We should however evaluate the numerator as positive, since
we assume that introducing new sheep does not lead to the predation increasing with more
than the sheep introduced. And thus we find that the steady state comparative statics
has the same effects as in the analysis of full compensation. A higher value of sheep
will yield a higher sheep stock, cet. par. The higher the reproduction rate of sheep,
the higher the sheep stock. The lower the normal loss rate, the higher the sheep stock.
However, since we know that the denominator might be larger than in the case of complete
compensation, it is so that the changes is smaller in size. Hence, a complete compensation
ex-post scheme should react more to parameter changes than the social planner would
have done. Regardless of the assumptions about the denominator, the local herder will
react too much to a price change.
Equation 44 states simply that the sheep stock should be increasing in the compensation
value. This corresponds to what we discovered in the section 5.2.1. The ex-post full
compensation was shown to lead to a higher sheep stock than the social planner solution.
These two cases was considered two extremes of q either being equal to 0 or the sheep
value, p. Since the values q can take could be interpreted as a continuous function between
0 and p, it seems like the the sheep stock should increase in the compensation between
the extremes. The comparative statics underlines this fact.
Equation 45 states that the sheep stock in steady state is lower the higher the carnivore
stock, cet.par. If there is full compensation, this cancels out, and there will be no effect.
Considering the variations in the compensation ratio, it seems obvious that this fraction
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will have a lower value the higher the compensation ratio.
In this short comparative statics analysis the effects from possible changes in the level of
protection as the sheep stock changes has been ignored. It might be that the effect of
protection of sheep are greater on the predation level when the sheep stock is higher, and
thus changing the effort put into protection. At the same time the marginal profitability
of the sheep stock might change as the protection level increases, and thus changing the
size of the sheep stock. However this effect is considered to not affect the the sign of the
comparative statics.
5.4 Graphical Analysis of Steady States
5.4.1 Ex-Post Steady State Analysis with Complete Compensation
The steady state solutions can easily be illustrated with some figures. First I will only
consider the case of full compensation since the case of partly compensation easily can be
figured to lie in-between the extremes of full compensation and no compensation. I will
consider the graphical relations of the elements in the steady state given by equation 25.
For comparison I will consider the sheep stock growth equation 14, where we in steady
state will observe zero growth. I will use this to identify the sheep stock in steady state,
and from this evaluate the other variables in steady state. From this representation it
can also be shown some graphical comparative statics, to see how a change in one of the
parameters p, s, n will affect the steady state variables.
We can split the steady state equation 25 in two parts. p(s−n−δ) on one side, should equal
the marginal cost of the sheep stock on the other side. In the graphical representation, the
first part will be a straight line in the X-diagram, since it only contains parameters and
does not change with the sheep stock. The marginal cost of the sheep stock is however,
like previously assumed, increasing in the sheep stock. If the marginal cost starts out
at a lower value than the parameters-line, it is clear that this will eventually lead to
an intersection, illustrating the steady state. This solves the steady state solution for
X = X∗, which is depicted in figure 9.
Considering the sheep stock growth equation in steady state, we have that X˙ = (s −
n)X − K(W,X,E) − h = 0. This can be rearranged to h = (s − n)X − K(W,X,E).
A graphical representation of this in the X-diagram can from the X∗-value help us to
identify the steady state predation and harvest. We know that the birth rate, s, must by
definition be larger than the natural loss rate, n, and that the growth in sheep stock from
this must be increasing in the stock. The predation is also assumed to be increasing in
the sheep stock. In the graphical representation, this is for simplicity matters represented
as a straight line. This relation could as well be concave, however it would not change
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p(s− n− δ)
C ′(X)
X∗
(s− n)X
K(X,W,E)
X∗
h∗
K∗
Figure 9: Steady state solution for complete ex-post compensation
the outcome of the model. It seems like an impossible task that the predation could be
strictly convex in the sheep stock, since this eventually would lead to K > X. Hence the
case with linearity or a concave relation seems more plausible.
The sheep stock is given from the steady state solution. The sheep stock can then be used
to read the predation, and thus also find the harvest size from the difference between the
predation and the natural growth in the sheep stock.
Some comparative statics is easy to grasp from this figure. First of all we can see that
the sheep value is only included in the steady state connection. Hence the line marked
p(s − n − δ) must sift upwards, leading to a higher sheep stock in steady state, if the
parameter p increases. This must also result in a higher predation and a higher harvest.
Given that the predation function is linear, the share of human consumed sheep and
carnivore consumed sheep would be equal. If we had a concave relation between predation
and the sheep stock, it follows that the share of human consumed sheep increases while
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the share of carnivore consumed sheep decreases.
An increased birth rate, s, would lead to the similar effects to the steady state stock.
However, the birth rate also affects the sheep growth condition. The part (s − n)X will
therefore pivot to the left. The predation-part of the growth equation will not be changed.
Hence, we will have much of the similar effects of the increased sheep value, but in this
case, the human consumption share will increase while the carnivore consumption share
will decrease, even though the predation function is linear. This is due to the fact that
(s− n)X gets steeper in X, while the steepness of K(W,X,E) remains unchanged.
Recent outbursts of tick in the Norwegian grazing areas might have lead to more diseases,
thus discussions of the effect from changes in n is interesting. A change in this parameter
will pretty much be the opposite of the increased birth rate. An increase in the normal
loss rate will lead to a downward shift in the horizontal part of the steady state equation,
leading to a lower sheep stock. In the growth equation we will see a less steep (s− n)X-
line, while the K(W,X,E) remains unchanged. That will result in a steady state with
lower sheep stock, and hence a lower predation. However the harvest will be lowered even
more, since the steepness has changed. Hence the share of human consumed sheep will
decrease while the share of carnivore consumed sheep will increase.
5.4.2 Analysis of Ex-Post Partial Compensation and Social Planner Solution
The social planner solution have many similarities with the partial compensated ex-post
solution. I will therefore analyze both the social planner and the ex-post solution here.
This social planner solution is given when the q = 0,while partial ex-post compensation
is given when 0 < q < p. The change from the ex-post full compensation scheme is
the expression −(p − q)∂K
∂X
which appears in the steady state condition. We know from
the definition that this differential is positive, and since q < p it must be the case that
the horizontal line in the steady state diagram must shift downwards compared to the
horizontal line from the ex-post full compensation in figure 9. If the predation is linear in
the sheep stock, this new line will be parallel with the previous graphical representation.
If the predation is concave in the sheep stock, the steepness of the line will change and
not longer be horizontal. Since concavity means that the marginal effect is decreasing,
it must be that this line will slope downwards. However, this will not lead to any large
difference in the results, and thus the line is drawn linearly for simplicity matters.
It follows first of all from the steady state solution that we now will have a lower sheep
stock in steady state than with the full compensation. This is marked by the difference
between the solution in A to the solution in B. However, we must recall the second
maximum principle, stating that a lower compensation or the social planner scheme will
lead to a higher effort level allocated towards the protection of the sheep stock. Hence
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p(s− n− δ)
C ′(X)
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K(X,W,E)PC
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p(s− n− δ)− (p− q)∂K
∂X
A
B
K(X,W,E)FC
Figure 10: Steady state differences between ex-post and social planner solution
it is clear that E ↑ compared with the full compensation ex-post solution. This comes
into effect in only one part of the system, the predation. When the protective effort
increases, the predation will decrease. Hence the predation function will shift downwards
from K(W,X,E)FC to K(W,X,E)PC. If the predation function is additively seperable in
the effort this must be seen as a parallel shift. Because of the function specification, this
is my main stand. However in the graph this is illustrated as a pivot around origo due to
the fact that this is a more realistic assumption.
The complete compensation ex-post steady state stock is noted by X1, while the social
planner sheep stock is noted by X2 if q = 0. The predation in the partial compensated
scheme is given by point D, where the predation is given by the X2 sheep stock. The
harvest is given by the difference between the points C and D.
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5.4.3 A Graphical Intepretation of Comperative Statics
The graphical representation in figure 10 can both be used to consider what happens if
the compensation share changes, q ↓, or what happens with the steady state if one should
change from ex-post to ex-ante compensation scheme, or vice versa. It is clear that if the
compensation rate decreases, this will lead to a decrease in the steady state sheep stock
through the steady state condition. It is by definition given that the costs of the sheep
stock C(X) also will decrease. Due to the downwards shift in the predation relation, it is
a bit unclear how the harvest will change, however the predation will decrease. It follows
also from the shift in the predation relation that the share of human consumed sheep
will increase while the share of carnivore consumed sheep will decrease. While the result
on the harvest is unclear, and it cannot be stated how large the changes in the different
variables will be, it cannot be concluded how this will affect the farmers’ profits.
The social planner solution is given by q = 0. Thus the ex-post solution will differ from
what is socially optimal. It is clear that the ex-post steady state has got a too high sheep
stock, too high costs of the sheep stock, and a too high level of predation.
5.5 Comments on the Herders Dynamic Optimum in Norway
Figure 11 shows how the socially optimal steady state is deciding values for K and h given
by the optimal sheep stock X∗. The complete compensation ex-post solution is described
in section 5.1 and shown to be leading to a X > X∗. Since this solution features no
protective effort, the predation function shifts upwards like analyzed, and leads to the
ex-post solutions for the harvest h† and the predation K†. The Norwegian model features
the option that the conservation agency either pays the farmer to stay at a higher level
of effort protection, or provides the protective effort themselves. The optimal effort level
was discussed in section 3.3, and is assumed to be equal to the social optimal level from
the social planner solution. Hence the predation function will be at the initial level, and
the predation in the Norwegian model is given by K# and the harvest by h#.
It should be underlined though, that if it is the case that the predation function is not
additively separable in the sheep stock and the protective effort level, it follows that the
effort level should be higher than the effort level from the social planner solution. And
this would again lead to a greater shift downwards in the predation function, so that the
new predation function is even less steep than the original function from the social planner
solution. This follows from the assumption that the protective effort is more effective on
the margin the higher the sheep stock. And hence the social planner that face a fixed
sheep stock should deviate from the original effort level. The results from this steady
state analysis is summarized in table 3.
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Figure 11: The Norwegian ex-post compensation with effort increasing subsidization
5.5.1 Policies of the Social Planner
As the full compensation ex-post scheme leads to distortion, the social planner is trying
to correct for this by setting the protective effort level themselves. This is described in
the latest graphical analysis. However, the fact that the local herders do not consider
the increased predation when the sheep stock increases leads to a lower marginal sheep
stock cost, and thus a higher sheep stock. It has become more profitable on the margin
to have sheep. This can be adjusted by the social planner by taxing the sheep stock, so
that the sheep get equally costly on the margin as in the social planner solution. Thus a
correction would be to include a tax on the sheep stock, with the tax rate equal to the
change in marginal sheep stock costs, t = q ∂K
∂X
.
In the descriptive section, it was discussed how the conservation agency supported the
farmers through grants. For such grants to be socially effective, it must be the case that
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there is an external effect that makes the farmers have a lower sheep stock than socially
optimal. I will not discuss the matters that can lead to such positive external effects of
the sheep stock, but it is clear that these must either be related to the sheep stock itself
or to the harvest size. If one consider that there is such an external effect that should be
regulated through grants, one should also expect that this grant should be reduced by the
amount that leads to the increased sheep stock in the previous section. Hence, since the
farmers already are supported through the ex-post compensation scheme, and thus do not
notice all the costs from a high sheep stock, they should be taxed so to bring the sheep
stock to the optimal level. If there are positive external effects that are not included in
this model, the grants from this correction should be decreased by the size of the taxes,
so that the sheep stock gets to the optimal size.
Social Planner Ex-Ante Ex-Post Norwegian Model
X X∗ XEA = X∗ XEP > X∗ XNO = XEP
C(X) C(X)∗ C(X)EA = C(X)∗ C(X)EP > C(X)∗ C(X)NO = C(X)EP
E E∗ EEA = E∗ E∗ = 0 ENO = E∗
K K∗ KEA = K∗ KEP > K∗ KEP > KNO > K∗
h h∗ hEA = h∗ hEP R h∗ hNO > h∗, hEP
Table 3: Dynamic results summarized
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6 Numerical Analysis of Specified Functions
6.1 Function Specifications and the Steady State
For the next section I will insert some numerical examples in the models, so that it is
possible to examine how the compensation schemes will differ from the social planner
solution. To be able to do so, the functions used so far must be specified. There are
two important functions, the cost function and the predation function. The marginal
cost of the sheep stock is used to decide on the optimal sheep stock size in steady state.
Assuming the cost function 46, this leads to a simple solution for the marginal costs.
C(X) =
cX2
2
and C ′(X) = cX (46)
Inserting for this costfunction in the full compensation ex-post steady state solution given
in equation 25, we can find the optimal sheep stock in equation 47.
X =
p
c
(s− n− δ) (47)
For the social planner, the predation function is also determining the optimal sheep stock.
This function is specified like function 48, so that it is assumed that the function is
additively separable in the effort variable. This is a simplification, but a necessary simpli-
fication to get a proper answer to the simulations, due to the existing data sources.
K(W,X,E) = K(W,X) +K(E) = αWX − 2E1/2 (48)
Under the assumption that the predation function is additively separable in the effort
variable, it is so that there is a level of effort that leads to the ultimate protection. Thus
there exists an E = Emax which lead to K = Kmin = 0. In this section it is important to
be aware of this limit on the effort level.
This predation function leads to the marginal predation rate of the sheep stock, ∂K
∂X
= αW .
I will call this the predation pressure, which is the increase in the predation from increasing
the sheep stock. This rate should be considered constant, since α is a predation parameter
and the carnivore stock is given. Since this rate is constant, the marginal predation should
also equal the empirical average predation per sheep.
From this marginal effect and the steady state solution in 24 we can find the optimal
sheep stock for the case of partial compensation, and for the social planner. These are
given by equation 50 and 49 respectively.
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X =
p
c
(s− n− δ − αW ) (49)
X =
p
c
(s− n− δ − (1−Q)αW ) (50)
We may note that the difference between the equation 50, the sheep stock for a local
herder with partial compensation, and equation 49, the social planner solution, is that
the social planner would have evaluated the situation when there are no compensation.
That being the social planner consider the same case as the general local herder equation,
for the case when the compensation ratio is zero, Q = 0. At the same time we can
find the local herder complete compensation sheep stock by inserting Q = 1. For the
rest of this analysis I will therefore mainly look at the general case, and thus only draw
conclusions regarding social planner and the local herder by inserting for Q. That will
shorten the calculations and ease the analysis. Using the general equation would also
enlighten the difference between the social planner solution and the local herder solution.
From equation 50 it is for example easy to see that the term − (1−Q)αW is the only
one including the compensation ratio. Thus when the social planner would evaluate the
part −αW , while the local herder would evaluate this less the higher compensation ratio.
This makes sense since this part of the equation tells how the predation increases from
increased sheep stock. The local herder is less interested in evaluating this, the higher the
compensation is.
While it is assumed that the marginal predation in the variable X is constant, the function
differs in the effort use. It was stated that the effort should reduce the predation at a
diminishing rate. It must also have a solution where the effort use can be equal to zero.
Thus it is so that the elasticity of effort on the predation must be positive, but less than
1. A simple choice for K(E) = −2E1/2, which satisfies these conditions.
The general solution of effort use is given by equation 23. Taking use of the compensation
share Q = q
p
, the effort use can be described as equation 51. The ex-post solution is found
from Q = 1, and we can easily see that this goes towards a solution of no effort provided.
On the other hand we have the social planner solution given when Q = 0.
E =
(
p(1−Q)
r
)2
(51)
We can take use of this expression to eliminate the effort-variable in the predation function
given by equation 48. Thus it is not needed to make a measurement for the effort itself.
The predation is therefore given by equation 52.
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K(W,X,E) = αWX − 2p
2(1−Q)
r
(52)
Inserting for the sheep stock into the predation equation, the general predation can be
stated as the following
K(W,X,E) = αW
p
c
(s− n− δ − (1−Q)αW )− 2p
2(1−Q)
r
(53)
We can consider the case of the fully compensated local herder if Q = 1, and the case of the
social planner when Q = 0. The compensation ratio is present two times in the equation.
The first one shows how the predation will be larger in the case of compensation than
what is socially optimal. This is because the local herder do not consider the increased
predation due to increased sheep stock, and thus have a lower marginal cost from raising
the sheep stock. Since that will increase the sheep stock, also the predation will be
higher. The second part of the equation notes the effect the protective effort will have on
the predation. The fully compensated local herder will not consider this, and thus not
lowering predation. We should also note that this term is of larger importance the higher
 cet. par.  can be considered as the protective effort effectivity parameter. The higher
this parameter, the more effective the protection will be. Thus the difference between the
predation in the social planner solution and the fully compensated local herder solution
should be greater the larger this parameter is.
Equation 53 can furthermore be used to find the highest possible effectivity parameter.
This is because we can not have negative predation. Thus MAX is given when K = 0
and Q = 0. Rearranging equation 53 leads to equation 54.
 =
( r
2c
αW (s− n− δ − αW )
)1/2
(54)
My main focus will be to numerically analyze the social planner solution against the
solution for the fully compensated local herder. I will then consider the cases for Q = 0
and Q = 1, with some estimates for the parameters. First I will look at some of the
general results, with some numbers. This will lead to estimates for the sheep stock costs
given by equation 46, the sheep stock given by equation 50, the effort level given by 51,
the harvest in steady state given by equation 55, and the profit for the society in the
different schemes. The profit should be considered without the transfer, since this is
just a transaction through the society, thus both the social planner and the local herder
comparable profit should be counted by equation 56.
h = (s− n)X −K(W,X,E) (55)
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Π = ph− C(X)− rE (56)
In the next section I will discuss these solutions. But there will also be a discussion
about the harvest and the profit at different protective effort effectivity parameter. This
is discussed by graphical representations in the section 6.3.
6.2 Numerical Analysis
Skonhoft (2008) analyses the sheep herding in Norway with a numerical model. Some of
the parameter values can be utilized in this numerical illustration as well, while others
will be tweaked so that the model fits to the analysis and the sheep stock size in Norway
today. There are also some numbers that can be utilized from the descriptive discussion
in Ekspertpanel (2011).
In Ekspertpanel (2011) it is stated that about 2 million sheep are grazing each summer.
From these about 125, 000 are lost due to various reasons. 30% of this is due to predation.
In numbers this accounts to 37, 500 sheep are lost due to predation each year. The rest of
the loss is normal loss, which accounts for 70% of the loss, or about 87, 500 sheep. From
this it is easy to calculate the normal loss rate, n, which is given by equation 57.
n =
87, 500
2, 000, 000
≈ 0.04 (57)
Skonhoft (2008) uses n = 0.05 and n = 0.09 for adults and lambs respectively. As
geographical variations might occur, and also that this might vary over time, it seems like
n = 0.04 might be a low estimate. I will therefore use n = 0.05 in my estimates.
In the same matter we can find the predation pressure, or the average predation per sheep,
since we know that this is linear in the sheep stock. Assuming that there are no protective
effort in Norway, with a loss about 37, 500 sheep, we should have an expected loss rate of
αW =
K(W,X,E)
X
37, 500
2, 000, 000
≈ 0.02 (58)
Skonhoft (2008) uses the predation fraction 0.03 and 0.05 for adults and lambs respec-
tively. Considering that there are great variations in predation across Norway, it might
be considered that the predation rate in a carnivore dense area is significantly higher than
the country average. Also, this approximation of the predation rate is only valid if we
assume that there is no protective effort in Norway today. If this assumption is wrong,
the predation pressure might be higher. Thus I will use αW = 0.04.
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Skonhoft (2008) uses a sheep slaughter value of 100 and 120 euros for adults and lambs
respectively. I will ignore the wool value, and just focus on the slaughter price. Thus I
will assume that the price is 120 euros per sheep. Furthermore Skonhoft (2008) uses a
variable marginal cost c = 1.1. This corresponds to the cost parameter c in the presented
model. However, Skonhoft (2008) also uses a fixed marginal cost, which the cost function
specification presented in equation 46 ignores. Thus the marginal costs might be under-
represented. I will therefore use c = 1.2 to correct for this. Skonhoft (2008) also uses the
sheep fertility rate s = 1.53, which is the number of lambs per adult.
The discount rate will be set to δ = 0.03. The discount rate is assumed to be equal to
the social planner and the local herder. The local herder might not evaluate time in the
same matter as the social planner, and thus we should be aware of this when analyzing
the results.
The off-farm wage rate, or herding alternative cost, r, and the protection effectivity
parameter  is harder to specify. However, these two variables work only in relation to
each other. Thus if the herding alternative wage is erroneously set, it can be corrected by
assigning the effort effectivity parameter a different value. The effort effectivity parameter
has not been estimated directly, and thus I will only discuss different levels of this. With
this in mind, and since we do not have or need any definition on measurement on the
effort level, one may rather use an index for the wage rate, rather than the actual wage
level. Thus I will use r = 25.
From equation 54 it was stated that there would be some maximum value for the protective
effort effectivity parameter, since the predation can not be negative. With the assumed
values of the parameters that are summarized in table 4, we can find that the highest
value  can take is  ≈ 0.766. The lowest value  can take is zero, and for that case
protective effort have no use.
Variable Description Value Min Max Unit
δ Discount rate 0.03
n Normal loss rate 0.05
s Sheep reproduction rate 1.53
p Sheep value 120 Euro per animal
c Sheep marginal cost 1.2 Euro
r Herding alternative cost 25 Euro per hour
αW Predation pressure 0.04
 Protection effort parameter 0 0.75
Table 4: Parameter values
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6.2.1 No Effect of Protective Effort
First I will consider the case where protecting the herd is useless.  = 0 and there are no
means to reduce the predation. I consider four cases. The social planner solution, which is
equal to the ex-ante compensation solution, the ex-post compensated local herder solution
with full compensation, the ex-post partial compensated local herder solution, and the
ex-post fully compensated local herder with subsidized protective effort.
Using the values from table 4 and  = 0 results in the table 5 we will find the effort use by
equation 51, which obviously counts to nothing for all the different schemes. The sheep
stock can be found through the golden rule equation 50. The costs of the sheep stock
follows from equation 46. The predation is then given by equation 48. The harvest in
steady state is given by equation 55. And the profits follow from equation 56.
The four different scenarios are analyzed in this table. In the first column, the results
for the social planner are displayed. In the second column, the results for the fully
compensated local herder are shown. Results for a partial compensated local herder is
shown in the third column, where the compensation ratio is set to 1
2
. The fourth column
depicts the compensation scheme that includes effort increasing subsidies, like we might
see in Norway. Since we have assumed a predation function that is separable in the effort
parameter, it is assumed that the effort level adjusts to the effort level in the social planner
state. But the sheep stock size is set to the fully compensated local herder model.
In table 5 it is assumed that there are no effect from protective effort,  = 0. Under
this situation, the social planner will not provide any effort either, since it is of no use.
Thus the only thing that differs between the social planner solution and the local herder
solutions is the size of the sheep stock, which is larger for the local herder due to the
increased profitability through the compensation. The increased sheep stock do influence
the other variables, since they variate with the sheep stock. It leads to larger costs of the
sheep stock than in the social planner solution. It also yields a higher predation, however,
this is not due to lack of effort, but due to the increased predation alone. Because of the
high stock, the harvest also increases, even though the predation is higher to the local
herder. Hence the increased sheep stock outweighs the increased predation.
Social Planner Q = 0 Local Herder Q = 1 Local Herder Q = 0.5 Local Herder Q = 1, E = ESP
E 0 0 0 0
X 141 145 143 145
C(X) 11, 928.6 12, 615 12, 269.4 12, 615
K 5.64 5.8 5.72 5.8
h 203.04 208.8 205.92 208.8
Π 12, 436.2 12, 441 12, 441 12, 441
Table 5: Key values when no effect of protection
The partial compensated local herder will due to the partial compensation not experience
the same increased profitability as the fully compensated local herder, and thus the adap-
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tion would lie in-between the social planner solution and the local herder solution. The
fully compensated and effort subsidized local herder solution will not differ from the
regular fully compensated local herder solution. This is because the socially optimal effort
level is equal to zero and equal to the fully compensated local herder effort allocation.
It might seem like a paradox that the profit in the models are lowest in the social planner
solution. This is due to the fact that the discount rate moves the social planner solution
away from the static maximum because of impatient behavior. With these numbers, the
dynamic local herder solution actually gets closer to the static maximum than the social
planner solution.
6.2.2 Some Effect of Protective Effort
Social Planner Q = 0 Local Herder Q = 1 Local Herder Q = 0.5 Local Herder Q = 1, E = ESP
E 0.2304 0 0.0576 0.2304
X 141 145 143 145
C(X) 11, 928.6 12, 615 12, 269.4 12, 615
K 5.544 5.8 5.672 5.70
h 203.136 208.8 205.968 208.896
Π 12, 441.96 12, 441 12, 445.32 12, 446.76
Table 6: Key values for the situation with some effect of protection,  = 0.1
In table 6 the -parameter is changed to 0.1. Thus it tells that the protective effort will
help at some level. This alters the results since the social planner now would prefer to
provide protective effort. The sheep stock and the costs remains the same as in table 5,
but the predation will be lower in the social planner case than it was before. Therefore the
harvest will be higher and the profits will increase as well. The fully compensated local
herder will not differ in the solution from the previous case, but the partially compensated
local herder will change behavior to some degree, but not as much as the social planner.
In table 7 the effect from the protective effort on the predation is even higher. Thus
the results change even more. We can notice an increased difference between the social
planner solution and the fully compensated local herder solution. Furthermore we can
see that the harvest in the social planner solution increases as  increases, and that the
profits increase while the -parameter increases. On the other side, we can see that the
local herder solution is unaffected by this parameter change, since protective effort is of
no interest anyway. Thus the social loss from having a full compensation ex-post scheme
is affected by how effective the tools for protective effort is.
6.3 The Protective Effort Effectivity Parameter
We observed in the numerical examples from the last section that the effectivity of the
protection effort influences the results. We would face the same sheep stock, X, regardless
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Social Planner Q = 0 Local Herder Q = 1 Local Herder Q = 0.5 Local Herder Q = 1, E = ESP
E 0.9216 0 0.2304 0.9216
X 141 145 143 145
C(X) 11, 928.6 12, 615 12, 269.4 12, 615
K 5.256 5.8 5.528 5.416
h 203.424 208.8 206.112 209.184
Π 12, 459.24 12, 441 12, 458.28 12, 464.04
Table 7: Key values when some effect of protection,  = 0.2
of the effort effectivity parameter, but the effort used, E, changes due to increased profit-
ability. Because of this also predation, K, harvest h and profits, Π alters. In section 5
the steady state was analyzed, and we noticed that the harvest in the ex-post solution
could not be decided to be greater or smaller than the social planner solution. This was
summarized in table 3. In this section it is possible to analyze to see if there exists an
effectivity parameter which makes the harvest in ex-post and social planner solutions
equal. And it is possible to see how the difference in the harvest changes with a varying
effectivity parameter. To do this, we need some additional calculations. The harvest in
steady state is given by equation 14 for X˙ = 0.
h = (s− n)X −K(W,X,E) (59)
Inserting for the predation K from equation 53 and for the sheep stock from equation 50,
and rearranging, we can find the following expression for the harvest, or sheep sold through
the butcher.
Figure 12: The optimal social planner harvest at different effectivity parameters. The
effectivity parameter  is on the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis measures
the total harvest.
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h =
p
c
(s− n− αW )(s− n− δ − (1−Q)αW ) + 2p
22(1−Q)
r
(60)
With the parameters we used earlier, the harvest will vary in the -parameter. Thus, for
any given compensation rate, Q, this will graph in the the (, h)-diagram. In figure 12
we can see this drawn for Q = 0, the social planner case. We see from expression 60
that for the case of full compensation ex-post scheme, Q = 1, the part of the equation
with the effectivity parameter cancels out, and thus the h-line will be a constant in the
(, h)-diagram. This corresponds with the results for the fully ex-post compensated local
herder in section 6.2. The reason is that the effectivity parameter only affects the use of
effort. Since the local herder will not provide protective effort under the fully compensated
ex-post scheme, there will therefore be no alteration to the predation, nor to the harvest.
The difference between the harvest in the social planner solution and the ex-post compen-
sated local herder solution can be calculated by hSP −hLH , where hSP is the harvest with
Q = 0 and hLH is the harvest with 1 ≥ Q > 0. Calculation of the difference in harvest
yields the equation 61, this is calculated with some help from the notes in section 8.3
The result is graphed in figure 13 for Q = 1. This illustrates the difference in harvest
between the social planner solution and the local herder solution. Since hLH with full
compensation Q = 1 is a constant value, and not influenced by , it would be so that the
harvest difference function is equal to figure 12, but with a downwards shift.
Figure 13: The difference in harvest between the social planner and the local herder
solution. Negative values indicates higher harvest in the local herder solution
than what is consider optimal to the society.
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hSP − hLH =
(
−p
c
αW (s− n− αW ) + 2p
22
r
)
Q (61)
In this equation it is obvious that if Q = 0, there is no compensation, there will be no
difference between the social planner solution and the local herder solution. The first
part within the brackets is the difference between the solutions due to increased sheep
stock in the compensated local herder solution. The difference in the last part of the
equation is due to the increased effort use in the social planner solution. Thus there
are two different effects, one leading to higher harvest, while the other effect works in
the opposite direction. We can however see from the figure 13 that the stock effect is
dominant for the most values of .
The profit can be examined similarly. Using the profit from equation 56, we can insert from
the harvest from equation 55, the predation from equation 48, the costs from equation 46,
the sheep stock from equation 50 and the effort use from equation 51. Shortening the
equation leads to equation 62.
Π =
p2
2c
(s− n+ δ − (1 +Q)αW )(s− n− δ − (1−Q)αW ) + (1−Q
2)p22
r
(62)
Figure 14: The social planner profit for different levels of the protection effort parameter.
The higher the effect of the protection, the higher is the social planner profits.
The profit in equation 62 graphs in the (,Π)-diagram. For the local herder, with Q = 1,
we can easily see that the part of the equation with the effort parameter cancels out, and
the profit gets a constant in the diagram. In the social planner solution, Q = 0 it will
be the case that the profit increases as the effect of protective effort increases. This is
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graphed in figure 14.
It is possible, like in the case of the harvest function, analyze to see how the difference
between the local herder solution and the social optimum changes in the effort effectivity
parameter. Using equation 62 with Q = 0 gives the social optimum, and subtracting for
the case of the local herder with 1 ≥ Q > 0 should yield the difference in the profits.
With some algebra from section 8.3, the results are given in equation 63.
ΠSP − ΠLH = p
2
2c
(
(αW )2Q− 2δαW)Q+ p22
r
Q2 (63)
Under the full compensation ex-post scheme, the local herder will face Q = 1. This gives
us a function varying in the protection effort parameter. The higher the protection effort
parameter, , the higher is the difference in the profits, and thus the society loss from
using an ex-post scheme. The relation between the profit difference and the protective
effort parameter is graphed in figure 15.
Figure 15: The profit difference between the social planner and the local herder solution
for different levels of the protective effort parameter. The larger difference
from zero, the higher is the deviation from social optimal solution from using
an ex-post full compensation scheme.
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7 Summary and Conclution
This master thesis has examined the Norwegian compensation scheme for sheep lost to
protected carnivores. A compensation scheme is often a tool of fairness, but due to
problems of transaction costs and moral hazard, the compensation does not necessary lead
to the social optimal solution. The question for this paper was how this compensation
scheme relates to the social planner optimum, and how an alternative model could be
utilized. Furthermore I wanted to analyze how the sheep stock, harvest size and the
predation relate to the social planner solution under the different schemes. The models
used in this thesis are mainly based on the work in Zabel et al. (2010-I), but are changed
so that they fit to the scheme used in Norway today.
In section 2 the Norwegian compensation scheme is discussed in both a historical context
and with a biological background. It is discussed that both the Norwegian ex-post model
and the Swedish ex-ante reindeer compensation model have both strengths and weak-
nesses. The negative characteristics of the Norwegian ex-post model is in particular the
problem of verification of cadavers, the work load this causes to the conservation agency,
and the time lag before the farmer receives the compensation. There is also a problem
with the lack of transparent information, that could lead to frauds. The problem of verifi-
cation and how individual judgment has to be used for the evaluation of the compensation
is also a problem to the farmers. It might give a feeling that the compensation is not be
paid for all of the predation, and that farmers might feel that they are treated differently
than other farmers.
The ex-ante scheme is claimed to remove some of the problems that follow from the usual
compensation scheme. The removal of time lags are obvious, since the compensation is
paid in advance. It should also be clear that this scheme thus removes the conservation
agency’s work load at the end of the year. However, for the compensation scheme to
actually compensate the expected loss, one has to closely monitor both the carnivore
stocks and their predation habits and predation rates. Thus in the end the scheme is
still dependent on the cadaver verification. It is not sure that this scheme will ease the
conflict level that arises either. If the farmer assumes that there is a mismatch between
what should be compensated and what is compensated, this should lead to dissatisfaction
with the scheme. In addition there are some problems that rises regarding the distribution
of the compensation. This might increase the problem of fairness in the compensation
scheme.
In section 3 it is shown that the farmer looses the incentives to protect the herd under
the usual ex-post compensation scheme. If we have full compensation ratio, there will
be no need of protecting the herd. The sheep yields the same in compensation value
as in slaughter value. This is a problem, since the social planner solution do indicate
58
that protective effort should be put into use. One solution to this problem is that the
farmers are subsidized to maintain a certain effort level. However the problem of moral
hazard arises since the protective effort is hard to measure and to control. Thus the
subsidies should mainly be focused on protective effort that is easily measurable, such
as the shortening of the grazing period and radio-collared sheep and predators. It is
discussed in section 2 that some of these means are not necessarily effective in protecting
the herd. Still it might be wise to use them as it eases the verification of the cadavers,
and thus might lead to a higher acceptance among the farmers.
The ex-ante model is analyzed in section 4. It is shown that the scheme is fairly equal
to the social planner solution. Since the compensation does not depend on the predation
rates, but rather on the predator stock itself, it does not alter the use of protective
effort. It seems like this model is a great tool for avoiding poaching and illegal killings
of the protected carnivores, without reducing the incentives to legal protection. However
since the poaching is criminalized in Norway, the need of economical incentives to avoid
poaching is non-existent. Thus the compensation scheme is rather a scheme of juridical
interest and the concept of fairness rather than a tool for carnivore conservation. It is also
shown that at any given compensation ratio, the ex-post model with subsidized effort is
more expensive in transfers than the ex-ante model. The ex-ante model is still criticized
because of slack assumptions. Since the compensation is based on the expected predation,
and expectations often is based on historical rates, the farmers might sense that the future
compensation might be reduced if they provide too much protective effort.
In section 5 the static model is changed to one of the dynamic sort. The predator stock
is considered given to the farmers because of the criminalization of poaching, and thus
the static profits are only subject to the sheep growth equation. Under these assump-
tions the lump sum compensation in the ex-ante model leads to the same solution as the
social planner solution. The farmers that are given an ex-post compensation is however
experiencing increased marginal profitability since they do not need to evaluate the in-
creased predation from an increased sheep stock. Because of this, the sheep stock is larger
than what is considered socially optimal. This does in turn lead to a too high predation,
but in the theoretical framework the effect on the harvest is ambiguous. It is suggested
that a tax on the sheep stock, with the tax rate equal to the marginal predation in the
sheep stock, would correct for this. In Norway the sheep herders receive a production
grant. It is often argued that this is essential because of external values of maintaining
the farming activities in Norway. Assuming that such grants are optimal, it should be
clear that also the ex-post compensation scheme leads to higher sheep stock, and thus
indirectly is also a production grant.
The models are analyzed with numerals in section 6. It is shown how the local herder
solution relates to the social planner solution. Since the social planner is assumed to
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use a discount rate, the steady state sheep stock is lower than what it would have been
without such myopic behavior. Because of this, the steady state profits are lower than
the highest static profits. Since the local herder have incentives for a higher sheep stock,
it might in fact lead to a higher steady state profit despite not being socially optimal.
However, it is not considered that the local herder might have different time preferences
than the social planner. The simulations also highlight how the solutions relate to the
effect of protective effort. It is shown how the harvest and the profits and the differences
in this differs in protective effort parameter. The larger this effort parameter, the larger is
the social planners allocation of time to protective effort, and the larger is the mismatch
between the social planner and the local herder solutions for the effort allocation. The
results might be different for the herd size and the profits since also the stock effect comes
into play. It was discussed in section 2 that the effect of protective effort might not be
high. Thus if this effect is close to zero, the main problem that occurs in the ex-post
analysis is that the stock size is evaluated differently than the social optimum.
The discussion in section 5 and 6 has a weakness since it relies on the predation being
additively separable in the effort variable. This is a necessary simplification since the data
sources available lack estimates for the effort parameter, and the cross effects between the
sheep stock, predator stock, and the protective effort. It should be considered that it might
be easier to protect one sheep than hundred sheep. However the function specification
might be a fair approximation given the sheep and predator stock in Norway.
It seems like there are ways to reach the social optimum under the ex-post analysis, given
that the lack of protective effort is subsidized and that the sheep stock is taxed. There
might be a problem of moral hazard in the subsidization of the protective effort, however
this effort might not be very effective anyway. It is stated by Ekspertpanel (2011) that
one of the main goals of the Norwegian compensation scheme is to raise the local herder’s
acceptance of the predators. This might be easier to achieve with subsidized effort so that
as many sheep cadavers as possible are identified, and that less of the compensation is
based on individual evaluations. The ex-ante scheme has some downturns which seem to
make it hard to incorporate in Norway. The scheme might lower the farmer’s acceptance
of predators and there might be a problem to achieve a fair distribution. The ex-post
compensation scheme will have transaction costs since there has to be made three different
transactions to correct the errors in allocation. The first due to the compensation itself,
the second due to the effort subsidies, and the third due to the taxation of the sheep stock.
Thus the ex-post solution must go through more transactions to reach social optimum
than the ex-ante solution.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Farmers Acting within the Herding Group
A single sheep farmer does not work in a closed environment, but is affecting and is
affected by the actions of many other farmers. If a farmer provides protective effort, this
comes also to the other farmers benefit. Let us say that a farmer did regulate the carnivore
stock by hunting, then the reduced carnivore stock would benefit all the farmers. Equally,
if a farmer provided protective effort so that sheep killings were discovered at an earlier
stage, thus making it possible to discover the carnivore patterns easily, it would also
benefit the other farmers. Hence, there is some positive external effects in this system.
Let us examine a simple model to see how this comes into play.
For this simple example, I would like to specify a model where there is no difference
between the effort provided, poaching or legal protective effort. The effort from all farmers
affects the kill rate. It is assumed that the kill rate is decreasing in the total effort level,
and furthermore that it is decreasing at a diminishing rate. It is therefore less use of effort
the more effort is provided. The farmer has costs due to protective effort. This cost is
assumed to be increasing at an increasing rate. The assumption relies on the fact that
much of the effort provided is due to time usage, hence the protective effort gets more
costly on the margin. A farmer i has the profit Πi, this profit is given by equation 64.
Πi = p
(
hi − kE−1
)− cE2i (64)
The value per sheep is p and is assumed to be fixed, the number of sheep for farmer
i is hi, k is the number of sheep killed by predators and is affected by the protective
effort by the farmers E =
∑
Ei. The farmer has costs related to the protective effort,
cE2i , and wants to maximize it’s profits with respect to the effort level. Hence the farmer
wishes to maximize equation 64 with respect to Ei. The first order condition is given by
equation 65.
dΠi
dEi
= pkE−2 − 2cEi = 0 (65)
Note that the second order condition for maximum is satisfied for all positive values of
the parameters. It should also be needless to say that Ei ≥ 0. For simplicity, assume
that all farmers are equal. From this generalization it can be stated that all farmers
are likely to provide similar level of effort based on the maximization scheme. Hence we
know that E = nEi, the total effort is the individual effort multiplied with the number
of farmers. From this assumption we can calculate the optimal level of effort from each
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farmer, and furthermore the total effort provided by all farmers. This total effort is given
by equation 66
E = nEi =
3
√
pkn
2c
(66)
From this solution it is easy to see that the level of effort is increasing with the size of p
and k. Hence the higher the value of the sheep, the more likely the farmer is to provide
protective effort. And also the more the carnivores are likely to kill, the higher the effort
should be. We also note that the effort level is decreasing in the cost related parameter
c. Most important is still the fact that the effort is increasing in the number of farmers.
The more farmers n, the higher the effort provided by the farmers. If we analyze the
social optimal solution, this can often be considered to be the case of a monopolist. If all
farmers were cooperating, so that they could be counted as one, the optimal effort would
be given by equation 67.
ECOOP =
3
√
pk
2c
(67)
For the case where we will have several farmers providing protective effort, the farmers
will provide more effort than in the cooperative solution. Hence the farmers will provide
higher effort than what is socially optimal. If this effort is considered to be hunting
for predators, there will be more hunting than what is socially optimal. But not only
hunting will be high, also the legal protective effort would be too high. However, with the
Norwegian ex-post compensation scheme the effort level is indirectly regulated as shown in
section 3.1. This regulating might avoid such a problem due to the fact that all predation
costs are compensated. It should be underlined that this result depends on the costs of
effort not being linear. Thus in the time constraint specification from the original model,
this result do not appear.
8.2 Coase Theorem Applied with Reversed Property Rights
If we consider the Coase theorem, economical efficiency can be obtained regardless of who
has the property rights. (Coase , 1960) This can be applied in a theoretical example on
the sheep versus predator problem. Say that the society owns the land and the right to
use the land for the carnivore population. The carnivores have some existential value
in the society that makes it important for them to keep it there. Sheep herders use the
areas for grazing. The herders should thus have interest in paying the society for lowering
the size of the carnivore stock and for getting access to the grazing fields. We make the
same assumptions for the functions and variables as in 3, however this time this will not
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be modeled in a social planner framework. We consider rather the society on one hand,
having the profits from the value of carnivores by the value function, V = V (W ). While
the local herder face the profit function given by equation 2.
Let us now say that the sheep farmers wish to pay the society so that there are less
predators roaming the grazing area. They will have to pay b for each reduced unit of
predators, N . Thus N lowers the carnivore stock with one unit so thatW = W (e,N) and
that WN = −1. It is assumed that there are no transaction costs, so that the carnivore
stock can be reduced this way without any costs to either the society nor to the local
herder. Thus the society’s profit can be expressed by equation 68 and the local herder’s
profit can be expressed by equation 69.
ΠSociety = V (W (e,N)) + bN (68)
ΠLH = p (X −K(E,W (e)))− c(e) + r(L− E − e)− bN (69)
The society wants to maximize the profits. Since e is given to the society and can not be
influenced in this simple model, the only variable to maximize the function is N . Thus
it should be so that equation 70 is satisfied. The first order condition states that the
marginal received payment, b, should be equal to the marginal predator value, VW . And
thus this solution forms a relation between the payment b and the reduced carnivore stock
N . So that the higher the payment b the higher is the desire to reduce the sheep stock.
Note that if we consider the second order condition, it would be reached as long as the
value function is concave.8
δΠSociety
δN
= −VW + b = 0 (70)
The local herder has now got three different variables to maximize the profit equation.
This gives three first order conditions. Equation 71 is equal to what is socially optimal in
equation 8. While equation 72 shows however that the local herders will have incentives to
poach unless the punishment for such behavior is well executed. The last equation shows
how much the local herder will wish to lower the carnivore stock at a given price. Here we
can see that the price for lowering the predator stock, b, should be equal to the marginal
damage the predators cause, KW . The second order conditions and the possible corner
solution of the two first maximum principles were discussed in section 3. The argument
for a maximum in equation 73 goes like the argument for the maximum in the society’s
8This might be easier highlighted if one calculates the problem with the alternative costs instead of the
gains. Thus the profits of the society would have given by Π = V (W ) − qW , where the last part of
the expression is the loss in income from having the carnivores.
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profit function.
∂ΠLH
∂E
= −KE − r = 0 (71)
∂ΠLH
∂e
= −KWWe − r − ce = 0 (72)
∂ΠLH
∂N
= KW − b = 0 (73)
The equations 70 and 73 form the solution to the transfer from the local herders to the
society. Equation 70 forms an upward sloping line in the N, b-diagram like shown in
figure 16 under the assumptions of the predator value function used in section 3. This is
easily verified through differentiation of the first order condition.
−VW + b = 0 (74)
db
dN
= −VWW > 0 (75)
Equation 73 forms a straight or a downward sloping line in the same diagram, forming
combinations of N and b acceptable to the local herder. If these lines intersect, we will
find a solution for how many predators that will be removed from the stock, and how
much the local herders will pay the society for this predator reduction. That the line is
downward sloping can be verified in the same manner as with the combinations for the
society.
KW − b = 0 (76)
db
dN
= −KWW ≤ 0 (77)
If the lines intersect, we should have a solution to the problem. Combining the expressions
from the local herder and the society, we can see how this solution will be in terms of
social efficency. The payment in the expression 70 and in equation 73 must be equal.
Combining them will thus yield
VW = KW (78)
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Equation 78 states that the trade leads to a situation where the marginal value of the
predators should be equal to the marginal damage the predators cause. This shows that
the trade leads to social efficiency regardless of who has the property rights, under the
assumption of no transaction costs.
b
N
Kw
Vw
N∗
Figure 16: The Coase bargaining solution with reversed property rights.
8.3 Some Calculations
Some of the calculations in section 6.3 is both time and space consuming. They are not of
much economical interest, but to show how they are done, they will be listed here in the
appendix. What I had to calculate were the difference between the local herder solution
and the social planner solution for both the profits and the harvest. The harvest was
given by equation 60, where we would find the social planner solution for Q = 0. The
equations from this is easy to compare in the latest part of the equation, however the first
part is a bit more difficult to evaluate. Thus it is necessary to multiply the parentheses
in the first part of the expression. The multiplication of the parentheses is given by the
following calculation.
(s− n− αW )(s− n− δ − (1−Q)αW ) = s2 − 2sn− sδ − s(1−Q)αW
+ n2 + nδ + n(1−Q)αW
+ (1−Q)(αW )2 − sαW + nαW + δαW
(79)
The social planener solution should be equal to the case of Q = 0. Thus the comparison
of the two equation parts can easily be found by removing the parts without the Q-
variable, only comparing the differences. Thus, if we consider the social planner solution
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and subtract for the local herder solution, the result from the parentheses must be given
by the following calculations.
−sαW + nαW + (αW )2 + (1−Q)sαW − (1−Q)nαW − (1−Q)(αW )2
= −QsαW +QnαW +Q(αW )
= −QαW (s− n− αW )
(80)
Thus with this difference it is possible to finish the calculations and consider the other
factors of the first part of the equations, and the difference between the second part of
the equations, it leads to the result in equation 61.
The similar calculations are executed for the difference in profits between the local herder
and the social planner solutions. The local herder solution is given by equation 62, and
the social planner solution is given when Q = 0. The parentheses have to be multiplied
like in the last example. For the local herder we then get the following calculations.
(s− n−(1 +Q)αW + δ)(s− n− δ − (1−Q)αW ) =
s2 − sn− sδ − s(1−Q)αW
+ n2 − sn+ nδ + n(1 +Q)αW
− δ2 + sδ − nδ − δ(1−Q)αW =
s2 + n2 + (1−Q2)(αW )2 − 2sn− 2sαW + 2nαW + 2δQαW − δ2
(81)
Using the same technique as for the calculations of harvest difference, I choose to analyze
the difference where the Q-variable is included. This follows by the next calculations.
(αW )2 − (1−Q2)(αW )2 − 2δQαW = Q2(αW )2 − 2δQαW (82)
Together with the multiplier in the first part of the equations, and calculating on the
second part of the profit equations, this leads to the result presented in equation 63.
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